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ralHistories represent the recollections
and opinions of the person interviewed,
and not the official position of MORS.
Omissions and errors in fact are corrected when
possible, but every effort is made to present the
interviewee’s own words.
Mr. Edward C. Brady was President of
MORS from 1989 to 1990. In 1993 he was
elected a Fellow of the Society (FS) and in
1996 he received the Vance R. Wanner
award. The interview was conducted on
28 September 2010 in Vienna, Virginia.
MORS ORAL HISTORY
Interview with Mr. Ed Brady, FS
Mr. Bill Dunn, FS, and Dr. Bob Sheldon, FS,
Interviewers
Bob Sheldon: We’re here for an oral his-
tory interview with Ed Brady. Let’s start
with where you were born.
Ed Brady: I was born in New London,
Connecticut.
Bob Sheldon: Give us your parents’
names, and tell us how they influenced you.
Ed Brady: My mother’s name was
Dorothy, and my father’s name was Edward
also. When I went to school, teachers al-
ways used to add ‘‘junior’’ onto the end
of my name, but that’s not correct because
we have a different middle name. I learned
very early on that teachers were not always
correct.
My mother was an assistant to my
grandfather, and was a bookkeeper, as they
called them in those days. They did three or
four different local companies’ books, and
did their tax returns and other accounting
stuff as well. My father was in the Army,
yet I was born in what most people think
of as a Navy town. The reason is that in
World War II (WW II) there was a coastal ar-
tillery battery on Fisher Island off the mouth
of the Thames River, and my father was
stationed there to protect the submarine
base, research centers, and shipbuilding.
The soldiers would take the ferry boat on
Saturday into New London for a night
out. My mother actually lived in Groton
which is across the Thames River from
New London. One Saturday night they
were both out on the town, and they met.
Bill Dunn: Your father was in artillery
then?
Ed Brady: He was. He was an enlisted
person.
In those days, the regimental com-
mander could promote and demote enlisted
soldiers, so my father claimed that he was
a sergeant first class six different times.
[Laughter]
Bob Sheldon: He served during WW II?
Ed Brady: He did. I was born shortly be-
fore the war and after the Pearl Harbor
attack the Army was rapidly expanding. Be-
cause he’d been in the Army for quite
awhile, he was selected for Officers Candi-
date School (OCS) and went to Fort Lee,
Virginia–Camp Lee as it was called then.
My mother and I went there part of the time
with him, so my mother had pictures of us
on the train in the winter of 1941–1942 going
to Camp Lee.
Bill Dunn: Did your father serve a full
tour in the Army?
Ed Brady: He ended up being medically
retired in about 1946 or 1947 so he served
both before and through the war. Because
he went to Fort Lee, of course, he became
a lieutenant in the Quartermaster Corps.
We left Camp Lee and went to Fort Ethan
Allen, Vermont. We were only there about
five months. One of their big jobs was to
convoy units across the country, mostly at
night and through circuitous routes because
we were sure the Japanese were watching.
He was a convoy motorcycle escort as a lieu-
tenant. Then we were transferred to Fort
Ord, California, near Monterey; and then
to someplace in Alabama, and then some-
place else. Finally, my mother said, ‘‘That’s
enough, I’m going back to Groton and
when the war is over, you can come back!’’
[Laughter] So we went and lived there with
her parents.
Bob Sheldon: You grew up in Groton and
went to school there?
Ed Brady: I went to school in that area off
and on. I went to 13 grammar schools in
Canada, Florida, Groton, and New London;
I went to high school almost all in New
London.
Bill Dunn: How did you end up being in
Canada?
Ed Brady: My father’s family is from
Canada. After the war was over, my father
was medically discharged and by then he
was kind of rootless. He had learned to cook
and to manage a post’s mess halls in the
Food Service Corps, as part of the Quarter-
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began managing restaurants. It was a difficult
economic time with the demobilization. We’d
go somewhere for five or six months and then
the restaurant would close, and we’d have to
go somewhere else.
We were in Atlanta once, and I remember
my little brother and I sitting on the curb while
my mother and father discussed his not getting
a job there that they had expected. My father
suddenly said, ‘‘You know, we ought to go
see my sister in Canada.’’ My mother said,
‘‘Well, I guess so! We don’t have any place else
to sleep!’’ [Chuckle] So we went to Ottawa,
knocked on my aunt’s door, and she was sur-
prised to see us, of course. We lived in Ottawa
for two-and-a-half years, while my father ran
the dining room in the local country club and
opened two restaurants.
Bob Sheldon: Traveling around to all those
different schools, did you have some good sci-
ence or math teachers?
Ed Brady: I don’t remember too much about
my teachers in grade school, to tell you the
truth. The Canadian schools I went to were
quite good, and when I returned to the United
States. I was considerably ahead of the other
students. My 4th grade teacher in Florida was
very exceptional. I was always in considerable
trouble in school. She began giving me all the
day’s lessons at once, and when I finished she
would send me to the library for the rest of the
day. I was usually there by 10:00 AM. I read over
100 books that year. I was very systematic—
I would pick a shelf and read everything on it.
My 7th grade teacher in Groton was very good
to me as well. He would bring his old freshman
college books in, and have me read them.
In New London High School, where I
started three months into the freshman year
and then went there the rest of the time, we
had several excellent science, math, and English
teachers.
They had a very unusual school. It had been
formed from a private school, a public school,
and a technical-mechanical school that they
used to send people to who didn’t quite make
it in high school. The school had a lot of shops
and laboratories. They also had a very advanced
testing program in which they tested all the stu-
dents early on. Based on the test results, they
told us what track we would be in, and they sent
a letter home to inform our parents. They had
a General High School track, a General Business
track for girls, and both a Liberal Arts and an
Engineering College track. I was among about
40 other kids that were put in the pre-engineering
college track. No one asked us or our parents
what we wanted to study.
All the time I went to high school, I had to
take some kind of shop every semester. I had au-
tomobile mechanics, woodworking, metal lathes,
and three years of mechanical drawing; as well
as five years of math, five years of science, and
two foreign languages. And I worked 30 hours
a week in a grocery store.
Also, we were put into a continuous two
year English program our last two years be-
cause they feared that as engineering students
we would never study English again. There
were about 35 students in that class. One kid
got an A, one quarter. No one else ever did.
We wrote a 500 word paper every week for the
two years, as well as the normal studies. And
we took various types of tests similar to the
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) dozens of times.
At the end, everyone in that class scored over
700 on the Verbal SAT. Not bad for science and
math students!
Bob Sheldon: Which foreign languages?
Ed Brady: French and Spanish.
Bob Sheldon: The Coast Guard Academy is in
New London. Did you do anything with the
Coast Guard Academy?
Ed Brady:When it came time to go to college,
I picked the Coast Guard Academy as my
backup school because entry there is totally on
a competitive basis–I was pretty sure that I
could get in. It was my last choice because I
didn’t want to go to school in my own home
town.
I applied to a number of the academies, and
being a Navy town, there were lots of kids there
applying to the Academies. It was a natural
thing to think about, and in my case I had no
money. We were quite poor for a number of
years. Then my father got better jobs. We lived
in a trailer until I started high school. I also ap-
plied to a Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT)-Amherst program at the urging of my
French teacher. You went to Amherst for two
years and then you went to MIT for three years,
and you graduated with a Bachelor of Arts (BA)
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and a Bachelor of Science (BS) I got a full schol-
arship to that, but when the counselor came to
talk to me I told him I didn’t have enough
money to eat. The scholarship was nice, and
not having to pay tuition was good, but where
could I work and make enough money to eat?
He said, ‘‘Well, there’s no place you can work
while going there.’’ So, for me that didn’t look
very feasible.
I asked my father what were the chances I
could get in West Point or the Naval Academy?
My father told me that in addition to the politi-
cal appointments by Congress, in which I was
a second alternate, they had a pool for compet-
itive entry into the academies based on parents
being career officers. And that two or three stu-
dents a year got in that way. At the time, I only
placed 5th at the Naval Academy, so that was
not looking very good.
I signed up to go to the Coast Guard, and
the following month I got a letter from the Naval
Academy telling me I was appointed. It turns
out that they really take about a hundred com-
petitive students! So I had had nothing to worry
about after all. I got my father to go play golf
with the Superintendent, and tell him I didn’t
want to go to the Coast Guard Academy. I had
already signed a contract to go, and I didn’t
know how to get out of it! The Superinten-
dent said, ‘‘Well, if he really doesn’t want to
be here, we really don’t want him here any-
way.’’ [Laughter] They agreed and sent me back
the contract, and I went to the Naval Academy.
Bob Sheldon: What year did you start at the
Naval Academy?
Ed Brady: In early July 1959. I was in the
class of 1963.
And incidentally, it has nothing to do with
this oral history, but I just came back Saturday
from a President’s Circle weekend for donors
at the Naval Academy, and the Superintendent
told us that only 15 percent of today’s graduat-
ing high school seniors have sufficient math and
science to enter an engineering school. So their
recruiting pool for those degrees is now very,
very small.
Bill Dunn: What year was Roger Staubach?
Ed Brady: He was class of 1964. If you’re in-
terested in football, you should have gone to
Annapolis when I went to school! [Laughter]
There was a guy named Joe Bellino from New
England, and I believe that he ended up play-
ing with the Patriots for three years. The first
two years I was there, he was the quarterback;
and the second two years I was there, Roger
Staubach was the quarterback. They both won
the Heisman trophy. We had great football
years. We never lost to Army. [Laughter] And if
you know how the Academies work that’s
a big deal, especially for a Plebe.
Bob Sheldon: Talk about your other expe-
riences at the Naval Academy. How was the
curriculum?
Ed Brady: I was in the first class that could
take electives. Everything before that was man-
datory, and they were just beginning feeling
their way along with a number of changes.
The way it worked initially was if you wanted
to be in that program, you picked first year sub-
jects you thought you could pass, and took the
final exam at the end of Plebe Summer. If you
passed them, you started with the second year
courses in those subjects. When you finished
all the required courses, you took electives to fill
your required course load. I think that I passed
three or four exams.
By chance, one of the initial electives was
something called Operations Research. I think
I was in my second year when that was first of-
fered as an option. I signed up with a very small
group of other people who qualified to take
electives. We had a copy of a Morse and Kimball
book that was in draft form, and hadn’t been
published yet. And that’s what they taught
from. Many of the instructors were naval offi-
cers themselves and hadn’t trained to be Opera-
tions Research and Systems Analysis (ORSA)
people. We’d go to class and we’d work on some
problem for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) or
something, work out the formulas and think
we had the answers. Frequently, the next week
we’d come in and they’d say, ‘‘Well, we’re sorry,
but in the editing of that chapter we found that
formula is wrong.’’ [Laughter] We’d have to go
back and somehow unlearn it so that we could
remember the right one!
It was a pretty interesting experience, and
that was my basic introduction to ORSA. At
the same time, the Naval Academy itself was
becoming very systems engineering/systems
theory/control theory oriented. We had lots
of classes rooted in systems theory, which once
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I left the Army has formed the basis of my pro-
fessional career.
Bob Sheldon: Do you recall any of your pro-
fessors’ names from the Naval Academy?
Ed Brady: No, actually I don’t. When I retire
soon I’ll have to research all those things I have
forgotten. There’s one thing I’d like to add
though. Going back to the MIT-Amherst thing,
you can see that I was schizophrenic already.
When I went to the Naval Academy and they
added electives, I thought, "Well, the whole cur-
riculum is engineering because that’s required
and you get an engineering degree. I should
take enough electives in economics, history,
and political theory, and get my own equivalent
to a BA/BS. So that’s what I did. I graduated
with a BS in engineering with a major in social
studies.
Bill Dunn: Was that common?
Ed Brady: Not at all! There were maybe five
people. Now, of course, all that’s different and
many graduates don’t have engineering degrees
at all.
Bob Sheldon: After graduating in 1963, what
was your first assignment?
Ed Brady: We have to go back a little bit in
time first. The third year I was in the Naval
Academy, my roommate was a guy named
Frank Wroblewski, and he was from Buffalo.
His father was in the Border Patrol, and he’d
lived on the Texas border and the Canadian bor-
der. He went to Canisius College in Buffalo for
a year, and then he decided he wanted to go to
a military academy. His congressman told him
that he didn’t have an opening for West Point,
which was where Frank wanted to go, but he
had one for the Naval Academy. Frank took it
because he knew that upon graduation one
could switch services.
In those days in the Naval Academy, about
half the class had already gone to college for at
least one year. I had another roommate who
went to Texas A&M for two years before he
came to the Naval Academy. That resulted in
a number of interesting things.
I went to the Naval Academy two-and-
a-half weeks after I graduated from high school.
I was one of the youngest, I was the least edu-
cated, and they could go drink legally years
before I could. They could rent cars and I
couldn’t, so those were the guys I hung out
with because of the obvious advantages. Frank
and I did a lot of things together. He always
planned to go in the Army because that’s why
he’d started out with the appointment to the
Naval Academy. They told him he could switch
when he graduated.
During the summer between our third year
and fourth year was the first year the Army of-
fered the Naval Academy an opportunity to
send one platoon to jump school at Fort Benning,
Georgia. Frank was going to sign up, and I
didn’t have much to do so I signed up with
him. We spent four weeks in August at Fort
Benning during what would have been our
summer leave, and got parachute-qualified.
After that, I thought I’d go into the Marine
Corps. I knew the Marines had a hard time in
their Recon units getting quotas to go to jump
school, so I thought that would give me an
advantage.
During the senior year, you make service se-
lections and pick whether you’re going to fly,
or go on surface boats or submarines, or what-
ever you’re going to do. I went to see the senior
Marine colonel who was liaison at the Academy.
I told him I wanted to go in the Marine Corps for
three years, and go initially into a Recon Unit
and hopefully go into combat; because in 1963
we pretty much already figured we were going
to go to war.
Then I wanted to go to graduate school and
I wanted to study such-and-such, and then I
wanted to do this, and then I wanted to do that.
He said, ‘‘Where do you stand in your class?’’
And I told him. He said, ‘‘Well, that’s pretty
high, so you’ll be in the artillery.’’ I said, ‘‘But,
I don’t want to go in the artillery.’’ He said, ‘‘I
didn’t ask you, did I?’’ [Laughter]
He said, ‘‘There’s one thing you gotta get
straight right now – that’s how the Marine
Corps functions. When you graduate from here,
you get commissioned in the Marine Corps and
you give us your soul, and 30 years later you can
get out and we’ll give it back, and in between we
tell you what we want you to do.’’ [Chuckle]
I thought ‘‘Well, this is never going to work
for me.’’ As I exited his office, it turned out the
senior Army liaison office was right across the
hallway. When I came out, I saw it and I
thought, ‘‘Well, I wonder if I went in there and
told him the same thing, what he’d say?’’ It
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had never occurred to me to go in the Army
before that.
I went in and told him I’d been to jump
school and where I stood in the class and every-
thing, and he said, ‘‘Well, what do you want
to do?’’ I said, ‘‘Well, I want to go to either
the 82nd Airborne Division or the 101st Air-
borne Division [designated Airmobile in 1968
and Air Assault in 1974] because I’m already
jump-qualified, and I want to stay in a combat
unit for three years, and then I want to go to
graduate school, and then after that I don’t
know.’’ He said, ‘‘Well, how about if you did that,
you went to graduate school, then you went to
West Point and taught?’’ I said, ‘‘Sure, that works
for me!’’ We laid out 20 years of what I would do,
and I went in the Army. Then it ended up that I
never did any of it except the 82nd Airborne and
combat part, since I ended up going to Vietnam
and staying there for nine years. [Laughter]
In the end, on the other hand, Frank was
denied transfer to the Army, and spent about
three years in Navy amphibious ships before they
finally gave in and let him transfer to the Army.
The reason that I did what I did is that in the
early 1960s, there were a lot of things going on in
the civilian schools and in society in general
about Che Guevara and Mao Tse-tung. Guerrilla
warfare and resistance in general were idolized
by the peace movement. The way I am, I need to
have first-hand knowledge so I read everything
they wrote. I read every book from Re´gis
Debray, Che Guevara and Mao Tse-tung. I read
Fidel Castro’s works. I read T.E. Lawrence’s (Law-
rence of Arabia) Seven Pillars of Wisdom. I read
all the books written by Bernard Fall, who
was a famous French war correspondent and
historian of the Indochinese wars. And I read
The Ugly American by William Lederer, which
was quite influential at the time.
I read all these books and things were pretty
clear to me. What was going to happen fairly
soon was that we were going to fight on the
land, and we were going to fight with small for-
mations in the villages. (Just like Iraq and
Afghanistan now.) Therefore, I really couldn’t
see the point of being on a carrier throwing air-
planes at it, and other ships would not get in the
action. I wanted to be in the center of the action,
so that’s mainly what drove me to the Army and
why I wanted to go in a combat unit.
I went into the Infantry (to fight in small for-
mations) and to the 82nd Airborne Division as
a condition of joining the Army. I went to the In-
fantry Officer Basic Course (where I was in the
very top of the class) and then to Ranger School.
I got to the 82nd in January 1964, and had a vari-
ety of platoon commands.
My brigade was the lead unit in the 1965
invasion of Santa Domingo. Since I had the lead
reconnaissance platoon in Santo Domingo, I led
the 82nd Airborne Division from San Isidro
Air Base to link up with Marines who had been
inserted by helicopter into the Embassy grounds
to create the International Corridor. US na-
tionals there could be convoyed to San Isidro
Air Base where they could be air-evacuated.
Unfortunately, there was some confusion
in the dark, and we got into a firefight with
the Marines. So that was my first combat
experience—being fired upon by the Marines!
Of course, before we were through there I was
fired upon many other times.
I had received orders to Vietnam before we
deployed to Santo Domingo. In fact, I received
a waiver from the Division Commander to de-
ploy at all since being on orders meant that
I was ‘‘non-deployable.’’ When things quieted
down in San Domingo, I returned to Fort Bragg
to deploy to Vietnam. Somewhat ironically I
arrived there already a Combat Infantryman.
As I said earlier, once I got there I stayed nine
years.
Bob Sheldon: Nine years continuous or off-
and-on?
Ed Brady: Continuous. I only left once for
a week in Kuala Lumpur and once for a week
in Bangkok, and twice I got sent to the Pentagon
for a week.
Bob Sheldon: Were you there for Ia Drang?
Ed Brady: I was with the 22nd Vietnamese
Ranger Battalion that turned back the North
Vietnamese attack on Plei Me Special Forces
camp, which preceded and resulted in the Ia
Drang Valley campaign.
Bob Sheldon: Can you talk a little bit about
that?
Ed Brady: Being in the 82nd Airborne Di-
vision and figuring I was going to get sent to
Vietnam soon anyway, I wanted to pick where
I was going to go. I spent a lot of time talking
to the Pentagon on the phone trying to get an
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assignment to a Vietnamese Ranger unit which I
eventually got.
The 22nd Vietnamese Ranger Battalion that
I was assigned to was based in Pleiku with the
Vietnamese II Corps Headquarters, in the high-
lands near the Laotian border. In both the I
Corps and the II Corps areas, battles were be-
coming larger. As a result, the Vietnamese were
forming the Corps’ three Vietnamese Ranger
Battalions into a mobile group strike force.
When the regular divisions got into trouble,
the Corps would send the Ranger groups in to
fight the battle in advance of them. When oper-
ating through an area, we would usually oper-
ate as separate battalions.
Also, in maybe late 1964 or early 1965, the
US Special Forces started creating Special
Forces Camps down through the mountains in
I Corps and II Corps, mostly along the Laotian
border. These were populated with militia from
the Montagnard tribes in the area.
Our Ranger units were deployed all the
time, and took a lot of casualties. War in those
days wasn’t like the wars of today. It was very
normal to be deployed into an operation at least
two times a month, maybe three, and if it was
bad four times; we’d have 400–500 killed in ac-
tion (KIA) or wounded in action (WIA) in a
week. There was a constant turnover in the units
to replace the troops, and a lot of the US advi-
sors got killed or wounded. I spent nearly two
years in that job and never got scratched.
Everybody I ever worked for was medically
evacuated. When the Special Forces camps
started to get attacked, we pretty much knew
that it was North Vietnamese regiments. And
to this day, I guess because of the way the Intel-
ligence Agencies work, with triple confirma-
tion and independent sources and all that, the
United States was not admitting there were
any North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units in
the country.
We would get into battles and see them, see
their uniforms, capture their bodies, lots of ac-
coutrements, and things. They were obviously
NVA, and the US Military Assistance Com-
mand Vietnam (MACV) in Saigon would tell us,
‘‘No, they weren’t.’’ As a result, the Vietnamese
often got into battles in which they were signifi-
cantly outnumbered. We might be a battal-
ion out there operating where there had been
a report of a couple of enemy platoons in the
area, and it would turn out to be an enemy reg-
iment. There were a lot of pitched battles like
that.
The NVA regiments, as part of their training
I think, and to create local propaganda and
a feeling of insecurity, started attacking the Spe-
cial Forces Camps down through II Corps.
Over several days Plei Me camp came un-
der severe attack. The Ranger Mobile Group
was deployed and we routed at least an NVA
Regiment, although we took pretty heavy ca-
sualties. One battalion deployed by road and
was ambushed, which caused us to think that
there were several NVA Regiments operating
there. The movie ‘‘We Were Soldiers, Once. And
Young’’ opens, and they’re pursuing the NVA
across the Ia Drang Valley. This is the retreat of
the NVA regiments from the Plei Me Camp.
After the Vietnamese Ranger Group broke
the siege at Plei Me camp and drove the NVA
back, it was decided that it would be a good op-
portunity to introduce the 1st Cavalry Division
(Airmobile), commonly referred to as the 1st
Air Cavalry Division, to a battle; so they used
the 1st Air Cavalry in their helicopters to pursue
the fleeing NVA. Because I’d been on the ground
almost a year and I’d been in the camp itself,
and had fought against these particular NVA al-
ready, someone in the Headquarters had me fly
in the escort gunship for the 1st Air Cavalry Di-
vision commander over the battle, and give him
advice. I was there above the fighting on the
ground (shown in the movie) through the whole
thing.
Bob Sheldon: Was Lieutenant Colonel Moore
there at the time?
Ed Brady: Yes. He was the battalion com-
mander on the ground, and I was with Major
General Kinnard in the air. Unfortunately, sev-
eral of my West Point friends were with Moore
on the ground as company and platoon leaders,
and I heard them die on the radio.
Bob Sheldon: The book ‘‘We Were Soldiers
Once. And Young’’ by LTG (Ret.) Harold Moore
and Joseph Galloway gives a very elaborate de-
scription of that fight. Anything you saw that
wasn’t covered in the book?
Ed Brady: They don’t talk about the Viet-
namese role preceding the battle, at all. I mean
there were several hundred South Vietnamese
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killed, and they had broken the siege and
caused the NVA to be fleeing. We estimated over
a thousand North Vietnamese were killed be-
fore the 1st Air Cavalry even started fighting. I
know there is a limit to what can be put into
a movie, but it is generally true of most of the
US military history on the Pleiku Campaign,
as the US called it. At best, they give a short
paragraph or a sentence as to what precipi-
tated the battle in the first place. This inattention
to the Vietnamese role in the war often causes
a misconception of how the war was really
fought.
Bill Dunn: You were a lieutenant during this
period?
Ed Brady: Yes.
Bob Sheldon: Where were you during the
1968 Tet Offensive?
Ed Brady: Well, before I get to that it will be
easier to understand if I discuss the period from
1966 to 1968 first.
After operating almost two full years with
the Vietnamese Rangers, the II Corps Com-
mander (US) insisted that I leave a combat
unit. They didn’t believe in independent proba-
bilities as I do. They thought about being in
combat as though it was a series of cumulative,
conditional probabilities. They said ‘‘You can’t
keep doing this and not get killed.’’ I said,
‘‘Well, that’s not true because each battle is an
independent event, and there’s no reason that
this one would be any different than the other
ones—I’ll take a chance!’’
But, the senior officers didn’t agree with me.
Eventually I had to give in to the general.
Thus I first went to a beautiful mountain
town called Da Lat, and was a province advisor
working with the Vietnamese Provincial Gov-
ernment. I was the operations advisor to the
Vietnamese Province Chief commanding the re-
gional forces/popular forces (RF/PF) that they
used to man the local military units there, very
similar to our National Guard. I was with them
on a number of serious military engagements.
I was there for about a year, and during that
time the US Agency for International Develop-
ment (USAID) supported the National Police
Training Center there. They were building a
training camp there for what they came to call
the Vietnamese Police Field Forces–these were
based on units the British had formed in Malaya
during the communist insurgency in the 1950s.
The US had hired a small group of Australians
(Brigadier Sarong [who wrote a very interesting
book about this period], a group of warrant offi-
cers, and a couple of majors) to build this jungle
training camp and train the police.
Because I went to the Center often to observe
the training, I got to be friendly with Sarong. I
had dinner with him and some of his staff every
night at his villa. We talked about the war and ev-
erything. He had been a guerrilla commander in
WW II behind the lines in Borneo, and he had
been in the Desert Rats in North Africa, so we
had a lot of stories to swap. Also, he and others
who visited there with him had had key roles
in the British administration in Malaya. They
were very focused on the role of the Communist
Party in the insurgency and not just the guerrilla
units. I learned a lot from that group!
One night there was a civilian visiting there
for dinner. He asked me if I would come out to
the training center the next day, and could they
show me something? I went out there, and he
said they were forming this unit. But this was
not going to be a police unit; rather it was to be
a mercenary unit for the United States. All of
the officers in the unit were Vietnamese Special
Forces, and all the troops were either Hmongs
or Rhade Montagnards. So in a single platoon,
they spoke three different languages with very
few able to understand the other languages at all!
The trainers said, ‘‘We’re having a lot of
trouble trying to figure out exactly how we’re
going to train them, and maybe you’d like to
take that job.’’ I said, ‘‘Well, I don’t mind the
job, but what are these guys going to do?’’ They
said, ‘‘Oh, they’re going to be sort of like
Rangers, you know, do recon things.’’ I said,
‘‘Well, I know a lot about that. Okay.’’
So I was loaned by the United States to the
Australians at the Field Police training school to
train this unit for several months. In their gradua-
tion exercise, they went out in the jungle with me
as an observer, and set up successful ambushes
and killed some local tax collectors and others.
In the course of this period, I came to under-
stand from the American civilian visitors, that
they were all in the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA). And that what they were targeting was
the civilian Communist Party cadre, rather than
the military. That was why they were interested
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in communist tax collectors, and shadow mayors
and village chiefs that lived out in the jungle
and really controlled the villages.
At the graduation for these people, they
were given the name of Provincial Reconnais-
sance Units–PRU. In the end, every province
had several PRU units. They all worked for
the CIA province representative, and he con-
trolled them.
When I left Da Lat, I went to Saigon and
worked in the US liaison group in the Opera-
tional Command Center for the Vietnamese
Joint General Staff. This was a part of the MACV
Command Center that was co-located with the
Vietnamese Joint General Staff. This assignment
came about because twice I had been asked to be
General Westmoreland’s briefing officer from
the US Command Center, and had refused.
Also, I had been asked to be General Stillwell’s
aide in Thailand, and had refused that also.
They were looking for a combat veteran for
these jobs, but I felt, ‘‘Why work for a general,
when you can be in the field doing the real
thing.’’
General Vinh, who commanded the Viet-
namese Armed Forces, did not like to rely on
word of mouth and the chain of command to
send him information about what was happen-
ing during battles in the field. He had two colo-
nels on his personal staff. Early every morning
when the nightly reports were collated about
where the fighting was, General Vinh decided
where he wanted to send them. That is, to which
battles, and I went with one of them almost
every day. We traveled as the Chief of General
Staff’s personal representatives. As a result, I
came to know all the regimental and division
commanders in the Vietnamese Army.
Then my old CIA buddies contacted me and
said, ‘‘We hear a lot about you, and you seem to
now know an awful lot of senior people. Also,
you socialize, live and work full time with Viet-
namese. So there must be things you could tell
us that we’d be interested in.’’ I said, ‘‘Well, I
don’t know what you’d be interested in and I
can’t just repeat everything.’’ They said, ‘‘We’ll
give you a list of questions.’’
Also, they said that they wanted me to be-
come the Special Assistant to the Director of
a new program being formed. Initially, I was
confused about how as a captain in the Army I
could be assigned by them to their program.
But I agreed that it sounded interesting. A little
later, I learned that it was to be called the Phoe-
nix Program and I was to work for William
Colby who went on to head the CIA. My assign-
ment was personally arranged between General
Abrams and Mr. Colby.
I was still working in the Joint General Staff
Command Center at the beginning of the Tet Of-
fensive. This period of attacks was actually
pretty long since the first attacks which were
featured so prominently on US TV were fol-
lowed shortly after by a second series of addi-
tional attacks–thus, it came to be known as an
‘‘offensive.’’ I lived on the local economy out
by the Phu Tho race track in Cholon. Due to
the success the North Vietnamese initially had
attacking Tan Son Nhut Air Base, the Phu Tho
section of town was cut off and we were actually
behind the lines.
For three days, I was on the wrong side of
the battle. A Vietnamese colonel, who I knew
and lived in the same block as I, kept having ci-
vilian neighbors go and check on whether we
could get through the lines. One day he came
to my house about 6 in the morning. He said,
‘‘I think there’s a way through the lines, and
we’re going to go together.’’ He and I went,
and we got back on the right side of the lines.
Then I went to the Vietnamese Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS) command center, and worked there
and slept there for several weeks.
The second series of attacks is not too well
known to people. It was about a month-and-
a-half, two months after the first one, and it
was smaller in scope and intensity since the
communists had taken so many casualties
in the initial attacks. Around Saigon, the at-
tacks mostly got bogged down in Cholon,
which was the Chinese part of Saigon. Dur-
ing the First Tet Offensive, there’d been a lot
of political issues in Vietnam because the
Chinese merchants had a lot of destruction
of their property in stores; they claimed that
the Vietnamese commanders used unneces-
sary force and destroyed their property on
purpose.
During the Second Tet attacks when it be-
came clear that most of the fighting was going
to be in Cholon and the fighting was building
to building, block by block, General Vinh was
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . MR. EDWARD C. BRADY, FS
Page 58 Military Operations Research, V17 N3 2012
worried about the Chinese perspective. He sent
one of his colonels and me down to the front
lines to ensure avoidance of as much property
destruction as possible. We had to supervise
the use of artillery and indirect weapons, and
actually approve ‘‘requests for fires’’ from heli-
copters or aircraft before they were allowed to
carry them out. We were a half-block from the
front lines through the whole thing, day and
night, doing all this.
You might remember the picture of the
Vietnamese police chief shooting the Viet Cong
(VC) in the head. I was about 10 feet away from
them when that happened. People never under-
stood that the VC had just admitted killing Gen-
eral Loan’s wife and children, and so Loan had
good cause. Some days later, a US helicopter
misfired a missile when I was with General
Loan and he lost a leg. Some Vietnamese claimed
that the CIA did it on purpose, and that I had di-
rected it. But obviously we didn’t do that.
There is a lot of suspicion and even para-
noia in these countries, and there are a lot of as-
sumptions about what Americans know and
don’t know, and what we do and don’t do that
goes way beyond any capability we really have
to know things or do things. But that’s what
they think because they’re always so suspicious.
(Not so different as much of the speculation
over the Bin Laden killing in Pakistan). Not
too different than some American views of our
own government.
Once the street fighting in Cholon started to
die down, I moved on to my new position as
Special Assistant to the Phoenix Program. The
Vietnamese leadership for this program came
from the National Police Special Branch, which
is where my office was. We really don’t have
a good analogue for this in the United States.
The Special Police were sort of a cross between
Britain’s Scotland Yard, which is primarily law
enforcement oriented, and France’s Deuxieme
Bureau which is more focused on domestic
and political intelligence. The Phoenix Program,
if people do not know, had a mission of eliminat-
ing the Communist Party leadership in South
Vietnam. Since being a member of the Commu-
nist Party was banned by an amendment to the
Vietnamese constitution, this was a totally legal
police action. However, the program became
quite controversial in the United States.
Also, I was asked to take on covert intelli-
gence collection. So I had a day job and another
‘‘job.’’ After a couple of months of my sending
in reports, the CIA Chief of Station asked to
meet with me. During the discussion, he said,
"We think that you really need to be trained in
‘‘tradecraft.’’ We’re going to fly in two senior
guys from Hong Kong and give you a month’s
training here in Saigon because we can’t let you
leave; we don’t have time for you to be gone."
So there we were doing one-on-one surveillance
and dead drop training on the streets of Saigon!
I did this for a number of years, and ended
up having about 30 or so senior Vietnamese,
several Korean generals, and several high rank-
ing Thais who I collected information from. The
way an overseas CIA station worked then is that
all reports from field agents come in, and then
the Station staff analyzes them. They give them
ratings as to their credibility and importance.
Then they decide which ones they’re going
to send back to the United States. The ones that
were sent were called ‘‘disseminations.’’ I was
told that for a period of about two-and-a-half
years of fairly intense political turmoil, half of
all disseminations from the Saigon station came
from me.
I knew an awful lot of Vietnamese officials
and what they were doing. As it turned out,
guys that I had started with in the Vietnamese
Rangers, and guys I’d been with in Da Lat, were
among people who were planning many of the
potential coups. The Embassy asked me to assist
them in preventing coups and stabilizing the
country by befriending, working with, and dis-
couraging people who make coups. Most of
the Vietnamese officers that I worked with
spoke no English, and they were also anti-
French. They were among the disaffected in
the military. They were not especially anti-
American, but they were nationalist and anti-
President Thieu.
Bill Dunn: Did you speak Vietnamese?
Ed Brady: Yes.
Bill Dunn: Did you take a language course
before you deployed?
Ed Brady: No. I learned it there direct from
the Vietnamese soldiers.
I was Special Assistant to the Director of the
Phoenix Program for its entire duration, about
five years. Bill Colby, who became the head of
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the CIA, was the first director I worked for. The
second director was the guy who had led the
Che Guevara hunt and capture in South America.
And the third one, I never did find out what he
did, but he obviously did something to be in
that circle of people.
Bob Sheldon: Would you talk about the Phoe-
nix Program from your perspective?
Ed Brady: I’ll tell you the same thing that
I responded when they asked me while I was
taking my orals at Georgetown Foreign Service
School in 1976. One of the Panel members
(who was a senior aide to Senator Church) asked
me ‘‘Now that you’re much better educated and
older, what would you have done different
about the Phoenix Program?’’ I told them that
‘‘I would have started a hell of a lot earlier,
and killed them a hell of a lot higher up in the
Communist Party.’’
It’s what you have to do in these countries.
The insurgent leadership has to take amnesty,
be arrested, or be killed. It’s what we finally
started doing in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Bill Dunn: The term we use nowadays is
‘‘building partner capacity.’’ Do you have any
lessons learned on building these capacities?
Ed Brady: Without building up the regional
forces and the popular forces, and the Vietnamese
Army, and especially the police forces, we would
have never been able to extricate ourselves from
Vietnam. I don’t agree with how we did it in the
end. I think it was overly precipitous and it
caused the fall of the country, but in the middle
of Watergate nobody had the stomach to stay in
Vietnam.
That’s the same lesson those involved learn
over and over in every one of these countries.
Until the local police force, and in some cases
the Army, can provide basic security and stabil-
ity to a society, you can’t have a democracy.
Unfortunately, we almost always over-
emphasize the military and continue to do so.
To make matters worse, we don’t have any real
and experienced apparatus in our country un-
der the State Department to have the neces-
sary civilian and police advisors in the field,
in the villages, and in the districts to work
with local civilian authority, and that’s what’s
needed.
Additionally, it is very important to con-
front and eliminate corruption. There can be
no trust and acceptance of a government as
legitimate if it is corrupt. In most of the coun-
tries we end up intervening in, there is little le-
gitimate taxation to pay for adequate salaries.
So ‘‘informal taxation’’ is practiced down to
the lowest levels of government, including the
police and military. This is something that al-
most every revolt, insurgency, or guerilla force
promises to change in order to get the support
of the people.
Bob Sheldon: Before our interview, you men-
tioned that you did an oral history interview
with a person from Harvard. Could you com-
ment about that?
Ed Brady: It’s a book by Al Santoli and it’s
called To Bear Any Burden: The Vietnam War and
Its Aftermath in the Words of Americans and South-
east Asians. It’s an oral history that interviews
mostly South Vietnamese officers and North
Vietnamese officers, some US officers, a couple
of Australians, and some Laotians. It tells the
stories of people in the battles, the politics, and
the situation throughout the war from different
perspectives of all the different sides. There
is also a book on the Phoenix program called
The Phoenix Program by Douglas Valentine. It is
fairly critical but it is not untrue, and received
a lot of good press.
Bob Sheldon: I’m surprised you were there in
country for nine years, because one of the com-
mon critiques of the Vietnam War is lack of con-
tinuity for the military forces, that is, they were
rotating every year and there wasn’t much over-
lap between them. Since you were there nine
years, how did you view that lack of overlap
or lack of continuity?
Ed Brady: I agree that rotation was a huge
problem, and it is in Iraq and Afghanistan in
my view. There should have been many more
people like me. I mean, I only was there that
long by personally resisting the system. I’d
probably been there three years and was a junior
captain when the Infantry Branch told me if I
didn’t go to the next Infantry Officer Advanced
Course, they were going to throw me out of the
Infantry. [Chuckle]
I had the opportunity to come back on busi-
ness and I went to see the head of the Infantry
Branch, and I said, ‘‘I’m 26 years old, and I have
3 years in combat, all in Infantry Units. I have
27 medals. I have 6 medals for valor. I’d like
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you to explain to me why you think I’m not an
Infantry Officer.’’ [Chuckle]
He said, ‘‘Well, you haven’t had a Reserve
Officers Training Corps (ROTC) assignment.
You haven’t been on rifle training ranges. You
haven’t been a headquarters commandant.’’ I
said, ‘‘I’m not interested in any of that.’’ He said,
‘‘That’s why we don’t want you. I don’t know
what the hell you are, but you’re not a career In-
fantry Officer.’’ [Chuckle] So as a result, I went
back to Saigon and resigned from the Army.
I wrote a very long letter about all the
things I didn’t agree with about how they ran
the Army, how they ran the war, how they
ran the country. And their answer was that I
was ‘‘involuntarily retained in the Infantry
for the good of the nation,’’ and they would re-
view my situation every six months and there
was no need for me to ever contact them. They
would let me know when the situation changed.
So, in essence, they guaranteed me what I had
wanted.
I was in that status for two-and-a-half more
years, which suited me fine. The good part was,
as a result, I picked every job I ever had. I inter-
viewed who I was going to work for and de-
cided whether I liked it or not. And when they
said, ‘‘You can’t do that,’’ I said, ‘‘Well, what
are you going to do? Keep me in the Army
and send me to Vietnam?’’ [Laughter]
There’s nothing they could do to me except
throw me in jail, and they weren’t going to do
that. So I had great jobs. I worked for great peo-
ple. I had great experiences. I got out of the
Army in 1972 when they were demilitarizing
Vietnam; they called it ‘‘Vietnamization’’ which
was a part of the Paris Peace Accords. Bill Colby
and General Creighton Abrams had dinner one
night and Colby came to see me the next day. He
said, ‘‘You were the subject at dinner last night.’’
I said, ‘‘Well, I don’t know why guys like
you waste your time at dinner on people like
me.’’ He said, "Well, because the Army says
they have to send everybody out, and General
Abrams doesn’t want you to leave and I don’t
want you to leave. The only way you can stay
is to be a civilian, and we have arranged that.
All you have to do is go to the Military Person-
nel Office at Tan Son Nhut Air Base tomorrow
morning at 9:00. You sign out, you go across
the hall, and you ask for so-and-so. We’ll sign
you in, and you just stay right here in the same
job. So that’s what I did.
Bill Dunn: Stay right here as a –
Ed Brady: Advisor in Phoenix. So my first ci-
vilian job was the same job I had in the military.
Bob Sheldon: That was in 1972?
Ed Brady: I think that it was 1970.
Bill Dunn: Is that a government position?
Ed Brady: Yes. Actually, I suppose you’d call
it a cover position. I was hired as a GS-13 Naval
Intelligence Officer, so I was back to the Navy.
Bill Dunn: During those nine years, when
you were in combat, did you ever use any of
your ORSA skills?
Ed Brady: No. Not in combat really. Mostly
I stuck to commanding small units, operating
with small units, ranger-type of operations, spe-
cial operations. I worked with the Special Forces
a lot. I was in Special Ops. I worked in Intelli-
gence. All small units.
One of the things that happened in 1972
when almost all the military had been with-
drawn (the agreement reached allowed 10,000
military to stay for some restricted tasks), the
US structure within Vietnam was reorganized.
The position that I was then put into was in
the Office of the Special Ambassador for Field
Operations. There was a computerized evalua-
tion system developed in Vietnam called ‘‘The
Hamlet Evaluation System.’’ All the advisors
had to input to that from all over the country
to determine basic local situations about edu-
cation, health, security, etc., of the population
and how much control the government had in
every area.
When the military was leaving, that was
turned over to the Office of the Special Ambassa-
dor. I managed that system and all the analysts
who went with it. We analyzed percentage of
territorial control, percentage of population
control, percentage of villages that had police
in them, and things like that. We did a lot of
quantitative analysis based on the Hamlet Eval-
uation Report statistics, and we did a lot of sta-
tistical examination of the reports.
When Kissinger was negotiating the Paris
Peace Talks, I headed the Special Analysis Unit
in Saigon that backstopped the peace negotia-
tions (there was another unit in Washington).
The way the peace negotiations worked, once
they settled what kind of table they were going
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to have, they met for four hours. One side spoke,
and then they adjourned for two days. That was
for participants to break, analyze what had been
said, consult one another and their own govern-
ments, and prepare a response usually in the
form of a rebuttal.
At one point, there was a funny incident.
The North Vietnamese had claimed that they
controlled 90% of South Vietnam. Everyone
knew that this was untrue, but what was the
right way to respond? We decided to use big
geographical plots we could get on CalComp
plotters fed by the data in the Hamlet Evalua-
tion System, and overlay our estimates of popu-
lation control. Then I realized that about 30%
of South Vietnam was uninhabitable so that
should be taken out of the calculation. I decided
that we should color the different areas: white
for uninhabitable, blue for South Vietnamese/
US control, and red for North Vietnamese
control.
We were making multiple runs of these
plots to get them correct, and it was very slow.
Late into the night, I decided to tear up the mul-
tiple copies on top of my desk so that I didn’t get
them confused with the final ones that were to
be flown to Paris early in the morning. I went
out for a cigar, and when I came back I asked
where the final plots were? They said ‘‘Well,
we laid them on the pile on your desk.’’ Then,
I realized that I had torn them up! We had to
take all the pieces down to the courtyard, and
piece them together like a puzzle. When we fi-
nally got the right ones together, we taped the
tears down the back with masking tape and
shipped them off to Paris.
The next day the ambassador called me say-
ing that he had a cable from Kissinger thanking
whoever had the great idea of doing the maps
this way, but what was the tape for? Years later
I met Kissinger, and told him that I had made
the maps. He looked at me and said ‘‘What
was the tape for?’’
There was another interesting incident with
that system, when we were getting ready to turn
it over to the Vietnamese Ministry of the Inte-
rior. The United States wanted to see if we could
reduce the cost of the system, because the Viet-
namese couldn’t afford what the US Govern-
ment had been affording. I did a regression
analysis on 10 years of data and found a
95% correlation with historical results, if you
only answered nine questions instead of the 128
the United States had been using.
The Ambassador decided that he wouldn’t
be able to easily explain in a readily graspable
way to the journalists why there was a 5% error
around it, even though it had always been there.
He didn’t want to take the risk of a public re-
lations problem if he went from the 128 ques-
tions to the nine questions and claimed the
outcome was the same. So they wouldn’t im-
plement our recommendation.
Another time, they had a group of profes-
sors come over from West Point in the summer,
and they were doing these regression analyses.
For one of them, they ended up sending it to
me to read it over because people were bothered
by it, and they didn’t know why. One of the
most salient findings was that village security
was highly correlated to the presence of national
police in the village. As result, the study was
recommending a large increase in US funding
for the police. While the correlation seems to
be intuitive, the numbers were so high people
doubted it. The reason it comes out that way
had nothing to do with the math. There was
a law that said you could not assign a police
officer to the village until it was declared se-
cure. So, there was always a high correlation.
[Chuckle]
The results were highly correlated, and it
wasn’t meaningful. Because I knew a lot about
the country, I ended up working on a number
of problems like that.
When I was in the Command Center, just
before the 1968 Tet attack, there was an ar-
rangement whereby in order to incentivize the
Vietnamese Army to conduct operations over-
night, which they were frequently loath to do,
we would subsidize them more. One time they
had to renew the budget for this, and they were
putting together the statistics. It came out to be
much higher in dollars than they thought it
should be.
This action paper was working its way
around the J-staff and the section of the Opera-
tion Center that I worked for was run by a colo-
nel. I was still a captain, and we got along very
well. Our section worked for the major general
who was the MACV J-3 who was supposed to
sign off on the action. The colonel sent it to me
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and said, ‘‘See if you see anything wrong with
this.’’ I thought about it for a couple of hours,
and then I went back and told him it was wrong
by an order of at least a factor of four–it couldn’t
possibly be that number. But I didn’t know why
because the calculations weren’t explained.
There was no math in the paper.
He said, ‘‘Well, what should we do?’’ I said,
‘‘Well, you have to non-concur in this.’’ He
said, ‘‘I know you haven’t been at headquarters
long and you don’t know much about bureau-
cracy, but you see this piece of paper on the
front? Seven major generals have concurred
in this, and you want me as a colonel to non-
concur in it?’’ I said, ‘‘Yes Sir, that’s the right
thing to do.’’ He said, ‘‘Okay. Get your hat.
We’re going over to see the major general.’’ I
think his name was Armstrong, who was the
J-3 at the time.
We went in, and the colonel said ‘‘Tell him
your story, Captain.’’ I told him and he said,
"Well, why don’t you know what’s wrong with
it?’ I said, ‘‘Well, the math’s not here, and if I
could see the math, then I could probably figure
out what’s wrong with it.’’ He said, ‘‘I didn’t like
it either, but I signed it. Let’s figure out who or
where this originated.’’
It turned out it was in the J-4, and we went
down there and the general insisted these two
lieutenant colonels go up on the blackboard
and write out how they had calculated all this.
They were really pissed doing this for a junior
captain. They got down to about the middle
and I said, ‘‘Right there. That number right
there—that’s not right. It can’t be right. It has
to be wrong.’’ This number was supposed to
represent the average number of Infantry units
overnight in the field throughout the Army.
A part of my day job was to submit all
the operation reports every day for the entire
Vietnamese Army, so I just intuitively knew this
number couldn’t be right because I’ve been liv-
ing with this data for a year. I said, "where’d you
get that number?’ And they went back to their
records and said, ‘‘Well, we got this from Major
So-and-So.’’ Well, he sat next to me in the Oper-
ation Center.
I said, ‘‘Well, what did you ask him?’’ They
said, ‘‘We asked him the number of nights that
the Vietnamese battalions are out overnight.’’ I
said, ‘‘But the number we compile is battalion
equivalents, and the number the law requires
for this budget is an entire battalion. They are
vastly different things, and you asked the
wrong question.’’ They figured it out. We went
back, got the right number, and put it in. The
budget was reduced to a quarter of the original.
Seven generals hated me. [Laughter]
Years later I was at a pool party in George-
town, and this four-star general came over and
said, ‘‘You’re Ed Brady, aren’t you?’’ I said,
‘‘Yes, do I know you?’’ He said, ‘‘Yeah, I was
the brigadier general in J-4 that you yelled at
about the numbers in the report!’’ [Laughter]
Then he said, ‘‘I knew they were wrong, but
I didn’t know why, and we couldn’t find any-
body who knew why!’’ They had circulated this
whole thing, everybody thinking it has to be
wrong, hoping it was going to cross over some-
body’s desk that would non-concur. And of
course, once you start that process, nobody
wants to non-concur.
That’s kind of what I did—statistical ana-
lyses and things like that. It was pretty limited.
And it was just kind of incidental to other tasks
I had.
The biggest lesson to me from all this was
that to do good analysis, analysts need to well
understand the operational context of the ques-
tion and fully understand what the data itself
means.
Bob Sheldon: Let’s pick up your last couple
years in Vietnam as a civilian there. What kinds
of guys did you work with? You said you led
a team of analysts?
Ed Brady: Some of those were ORSA people.
Some were political analysts from the State De-
partment. Some were economic people from
USAID, and we were all grouped together.
I managed the group.
Bob Sheldon: How many were there
altogether?
Ed Brady: Maybe 10-12.
Bill Dunn: Where did the ORSA people
come from?
Ed Brady: Mostly they were graduates of the
Navy Postgraduate School. They were mixed
Navy and Army. I don’t remember any Air
Force people being there.
Bill Dunn: Military or civilian?
Ed Brady: They were military people who
had gotten out.
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Bob Sheldon: Did you get involved in the
Hearts and Minds Campaign?
Ed Brady: Well, technically these programs I
have been discussing fell under what was called
the Pacification Program.
Bob Sheldon: Do you have any observations
on that?
Ed Brady: I think it’s the right thing to be
doing. It’s very difficult and it’s got to be tai-
lored to each locality, but done well it is much
more effective than just military operations. I
mean, the military operations are good against
organized military units. You have to have some
identifiable enemy, and he has to be in a place
where you can fight, but if you want to deal with
scattered guerilla movements and things like
that, it’s more like fighting against the mob in
a large US city.
Many insurgents are more like gangsters
than they are like soldiers, and the best advisors
that I ever met in Vietnam for that kind of thing
were with the police. They had a Public Safety
Office, organized under USAID, and they’d
send advisors there. Most of them were ex-state
troopers whose biggest thrill had been to chase
somebody down at 120 miles per hour and give
them a ticket. Well, that isn’t really what we
needed but they were the kind of people who
volunteered to go, so there were a lot of them
there.
But there were a few people there who came
from big city prosecutor offices and worked
against the mob, and they are used to collecting
intelligence, collating it, figuring out who’s
who, figuring out what their activities are,
how you can get to them, things like that. It’s
the same way we figured out the Communist
Party structure in the Phoenix Program.
If you have that kind of background and go
overseas for any extended period of time, it is
not career-enhancing. So there’s very few of
them who are overseas. I think that’s what they
are trying to address these days when they put
FBI offices overseas, so that they’re not trans-
ferred out of their own organization, so to
speak. They don’t go from the FBI, a prosecu-
tor’s office, or the Justice Department to USAID.
They’re still in their own agency and they’re
placed overseas, and they form teams out of
them. This seems to be a fairly common way
now in counter-terrorism work. I haven’t been
on the ground in years and I haven’t seen these
teams in action, but I would imagine that this
works better.
But you need all kinds of experts. You need
agricultural experts. You need educational ex-
perts. You need legal experts. You need all this
on the ground to build effective local govern-
ments and improve the life of local citizens.
But it’s hard for them to be out and effective if
they are not secure. In my office in the Phoenix
Program there was myself as a Special Assis-
tant, and two State Department people whose
background was in constitutional law. The legal
aspects of how you conduct a campaign like that
are very important because if you are interested
in what they call the hearts and minds of people,
you need them to be allied with you. They need
to see that you are making common cause with
them in something that they want, and that
means it has to be legal. You’re no better than
the other side if you allow corruption, or com-
mit illegal acts.
Bob Sheldon: One of the big buzz words now
is ‘‘interagency.’’ How well did the interagency
work in your instance?
Ed Brady: It had problems. They always will.
You know, if you work in a company or you
work in some part of the Department of Defense
(DoD), the inter-organizational boundaries are
important, and sometimes they get to be insur-
mountable if you have the wrong personalities
involved. Interagency activities are even more
difficult because you don’t even have a basic or-
ganizational bond between people. We all see
this every night on TV crime shows when mul-
tiple agencies need to cooperate on a case.
The fundamental structure, today, is no dif-
ferent overseas than it was in the 1960s in what
were called ‘‘country teams.’’ The Ambassador
is technically in charge. The military is under-
neath him, and there are a multitude of agency
and interagency groups also reporting to the
Ambassador. In fact, I did talk to Ambassador
Eikenberry about how well this works in
Afghanistan a couple of years ago when he
was still a general. If the military presence is
large enough relative to the country and the
other resources, then the military starts to dom-
inate the interagency process. A typical general
is not well-trained to deal with interagency
issues, or even to understand anybody else’s
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issues and constraints. They want to be in
charge. They want to run it. They want an ob-
jective. They want to finish their mission, and
they want to leave. And that’s not what the
rest of the agency actions are about.
Training young officers to have a better un-
derstanding of these nuances and needs in these
lower intensity, longer duration wars is very im-
portant. And it certainly has not been the nor-
mal training of an infantry officer in the Army
or the Marine Corps.
The Navy is starting an initiative in this
at their Academy. They had 200 midshipmen
last summer that were sent overseas for up to
6 weeks. They were sent to the Ukraine, Jordan,
and the French Foreign Legion School in Africa,
among other places. They gain more interna-
tional perspective and more cultural exposure
very early in their careers. I assume West Point
now has a similar program, but I have no idea
how large or long it is. Modern officers have to
understand these concepts to be effective. It’s
been hard enough for us in the military to do
‘‘jointness,’’ let alone interagency, but it is now
essential.
Bob Sheldon: Let’s talk about the closure of
the Vietnam War. Were you there for the evacu-
ation of the US forces?
Ed Brady: No, I left around a year before that
in 1974. The last thing I did was to write a paper
predicting the collapse of South Vietnam and
I went through the country north to south, di-
vision by division, regiment by regiment. I made
an assessment of whether I thought officers and
units would stand and fight or flee, whether the
commanders had money overseas or not, and
whether they were likely to flee the country by
themselves and leave their units, or whether they
would retreat and continue the battle.
After it was all over, I was wrong on about 6
people out of 250. Unfortunately, it is a terrible
way to confirm that you understand something
fairly well.
Bill Dunn: With your analysis group, who
did your advice go to – at what level?
Ed Brady: It went directly to the Special As-
sistant to the Ambassador for Field Operations,
and then to the Ambassador himself and to
whoever was the Senior Military Commander
at the time. It also went back to the United States
to most of the Agencies involved, and on most
subjects to the White House National Security
Council.
Bill Dunn: How did they react to your
advice?
Ed Brady: When I was an officer there is no
good way of saying to most generals, ‘‘Well,
I’ve been here four years and you’ve been here
two weeks, so I might know more about it than
you do.’’ All he sees is a lieutenant or captain.
General Westmoreland understood this and
before he left he called me in. He said ‘‘Captain
Brady, we’d like you to not wear your uniform
anymore.’’ Well, I was pretty proud of my uni-
form, so I didn’t get it. I kept badgering him
about it, "Why would I do that, what sense does
that make? He said, ‘‘Well, we just think that if
you let your hair grow a little longer and you
wore civilian clothes, it’d be a little easier for
the senior military leadership to take your ad-
vice at face value and not discount it because
they know you’re a captain.’’ So I never wore
my uniform again. From when I was a junior
captain to when I mustered out as a junior major
two years later, I never had a uniform on. Some
officers are very open and interested and want
to learn, but a lot don’t want to hear it, especially
from a very junior officer. Even when I left Viet-
nam, I was only 31. Working with the State De-
partment and CIA people was easier because
they expected different people to be experts at
different things. So they tended to listen more,
weigh what you had said, and drew their own
conclusions.
Bill Dunn: Did you leave as your choice, or
were you somehow forced out?
Ed Brady: No, I knew that when North
Vietnam attacked, then South Vietnam was
going to collapse without US air power. We
had lots of intelligence that a major offensive
would be launched, and I wanted to leave. I
didn’t want to be there at the end. I didn’t know
when it would be, but I thought certainly it
would be a matter of some months.
Bill Dunn: Have you been back since?
Ed Brady: No. I talk to a lot of people about
it. I talk to a lot of Vietnamese who have been
back. I talk to a lot of Americans who have been
back. But one of the salient things in my mind
is what several CIA people who I worked with
in the early days there told me. They had been
with Bush when he went back to China, and
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they had been previously in China. They were
what they used to call in the agency, ‘‘Old China
Hands.’’ They were selected to go back with
Bush when he opened the Consulate there,
and almost every one of them hated it and left
within six months. I was biased by their stories.
When you go back someplace that’s so dramat-
ically changed, and not necessarily for the bet-
ter, then you don’t have the same attachment
to it. In fact, you most often dislike it. It’s not like
going someplace you have never been or didn’t
have so much invested in. So I have never gone
but I still think about it and wonder.
Bob Sheldon: Coming back, what kind of
a job did you come to?
Ed Brady: I actually came back to go to grad-
uate school. I had decided if I was going to leave
I had postponed school long enough. I arranged
to take the Graduate Record Examination (GRE)
in the US Embassy in Saigon, and I went to the
Embassy and took the GRE.
I had a Foreign Service officer say, ‘‘I don’t
know why I have to stand and watch you for
five hours while this is done, but that’s what
the instructions say to do. And I don’t know
why you are taking exams for college in Saigon.
But they told me you could, so I have to do this.’’
I took the exam and then applied to a num-
ber of schools, which was another interesting
thing. By then, there was a lot of anti-Vietnam
sentiment in the United States. And somebody
who stayed there nine years voluntarily was
frowned upon in many parts of the country as
well as in many institutions since many of them
had been centers of anti-war sentiment.
I applied to Princeton, and they told me that
they had enough government people in their
formal program with the government at the
Woodrow Wilson School. They said that they
didn’t need to add to that by taking somebody
on the ‘‘so-called civilian side’’ that was really
military. I was not accepted there.
Harvard had a similar story. Georgetown
was pretty eager for me to go there, and gave
me a half-tuition scholarship. But my father
was getting fairly ill then and presumably was
going to die soon. Since I’d only seen my family
twice in ten years, I thought, well, maybe I
ought to go to school in Florida where they live.
The University of Miami in those days al-
ready had a pretty good international program
mainly focused on Latin America, but they also
had a Sino-Soviet Center. The Director at the
time was Leon Goure, some of whose work I
had read. I applied there for Russian and Chi-
nese studies, and was accepted and given a full
scholarship. I was planning to go there, when
the Director of the Foreign Service School in
Georgetown called me and wanted to know
why I had declined their scholarship. I told
him that I had a full scholarship in Miami and
only a half-scholarship in Georgetown. And
even with the GI bill it was too expensive to live
in DC. I just couldn’t see the point of it.
He said, ‘‘We’re in the center of things and
they’re not. They’re a long way away from
Washington. We can get speakers here who just
take two hours out of their day to be with us.
They drive over here and speak for an hour-
and-a-half, and go back to their office. For the
University of Miami to get people like that to
speak, they have to give up a whole day! It’s just
practical, you get more exposure to the govern-
ment, higher level people, and more insight into
things here than you would there.’’ I said, ‘‘Well,
I understand that, but money is important to me
at this point.’’ He said, ‘‘Well, give us 24 hours
and I’ll call you back.’’ I said, ‘‘OK.’’
He called me up later and said, ‘‘I have
a double offer to make to you. Georgetown Uni-
versity will double their scholarship and pay all
your tuition, and I’ve lined up an interview at
Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) for a
job.’’ I said, ‘‘Well, that sounds interesting.’’ I
drove up from Florida, and went over to CSC
which was in Falls Church, Virginia at the time.
I went to the Office of the Director of Field Op-
erations, and I thought, ‘‘Well, that sounds fa-
miliar to me. I know what field operations are.
But what’s this in a company?’’ At the time I
didn’t know anything about Research and De-
velopment, or systems, or how the defense in-
dustry was organized, or anything like that.
All the overseas jobs that CSC had were or-
ganized under this part of the company–Field
Operations–and the deal they had to offer me
was I could go to Georgetown for two years. Al-
though it was in the Foreign Service School, it
was a quantitatively-based program. For the
two years, I could work half-time at CSC.
It turned out that there was a group of
Iranian officers who were going to be trained
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at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and at the Navy
Postgraduate School in OR. The United States
was worried about the Soviets invading through
Iran to get to the ocean. The Iranians were
going to use a US wargame and take out the
US/Soviet database and re-load with Iranian/
Soviet data. At CSC, I was going to work part-
time with these guys for the two years, then go
full time and go back to Iran with them. Then
I would stay over there for a couple of years
helping them run this wargame in their own
country.
After I joined CSC and had worked two or
three months, there was unrest in Iran, and the
Shah was having political problems. Unbe-
knownst to me, but perfectly logically, all these
guys were on the Shah’s side so they didn’t go
home! [Chuckle] CSC never got the contract,
and the rest of what happened in Iran is history.
I got bored working at CSC editing reports
and proposals because no one wanted to give
a significant job to a part-time graduate student.
So I went looking around for something else
to do. Remember in 1974, we had a gas crisis.
Being on a limited budget, how much gas I used
up was important to me. I had rented an apart-
ment at Peach Tree on Route 7 in Falls Church,
Virginia. I didn’t want to drive out of the way
somewhere and use gas that I couldn’t afford.
That meant I had to find a job at Tyson’s Corner
or on Route 123. In those days, there wasn’t
much in that area. One Saturday afternoon I
drove all around, and they had these directories
outside the little office parks that were there
then. I copied down the name and address of
every company that had ‘‘system’’ in their name
or sounded like it might be related to a system.
I sent them all letters, like 20 of them or so, and
I got about seven or eight replies.
All of them offered me full-time jobs, and I
kept telling them, ‘‘I can’t work full-time. I’m
in school full-time. I need flexible hours. I need
this. I need that.’’ And they responded, ‘‘We
can’t do that.’’
There was a company called The MITRE
Corporation, and at the interview there the guy
said, ‘‘Gee, I don’t know why we can’t work that
out.’’ I thought, perfect! I ended up getting hired
by them, and it turned out unknown to me at the
time that the person that I was interviewing
with, Bill Tidwell, was retired from the CIA.
He had been Chairman of the Overhead Recon-
naissance Requirements Committee and ran the
whole requirements process for satellite pho-
tography. He had been on active duty from the
CIA as the Deputy J-2 for Reconnaissance in
Vietnam. When he read my resume, he thought
‘‘There’s something that’s not really said here.’’
Ambassador Bob Komer, who had been at the
Office of the Ambassador for a while in Saigon
and had worked in the White House, was teach-
ing at George Mason University. Tidwell called
Komer and said, ‘‘Did you ever hear of a guy
named Ed Brady?’’ He said, ‘‘Yes. Why are
you calling me about him?’’ He said, ‘‘Well,
he’s looking for a job and he told me he’s been
turned down all over town and nobody’s in-
terested in a veteran or they can’t work around
his schedule.’’ Reportedly what Bob said, and
he was called ‘‘Blow-Torch Bob’’ for a reason,
was, ‘‘Hire the son-of-a-bitch and get him off
the street. We can’t afford to have him out
there!’’ [Laughter] I got hired at MITRE, against
the wishes of many of the senior people, in fact,
I found out later. It seems to be the story of my
life, right?
MITRE was starting an Internal Research
and Development (IR&D) project in targeting
and intelligence with the Army. The reason
many senior people didn’t want me hired
was that at that time many of the managers
thought that an IR&D project should be like
a sabbatical for somebody who had worked
a number of hard years for the company and
needed a year off. They didn’t see it as some-
thing productive that was used to grow busi-
ness. And so they resented someone being
hired off the street to immediately start on an
IR&D project.
I started off with a number of people not lik-
ing the arrangement I had and what I was do-
ing, as well as how I got hired. I thought that I
didn’t care what they thought since I was only
going to work there part-time for two years,
and leave. I worked there part-time on several
interesting and very visible projects for two
years while I finished the two-year program at
Georgetown. By then, I wanted to go to the
mathematical/developmental economics doc-
torate program there. I talked to my Division
Director at MITRE and he said, ‘‘Well, here’s
what we’ll do. We want to promote you to be
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a manager, but if you do that you have to work
full-time. And we will pay for your tuition.’’ I
said, ‘‘Well, as luck would have it, the doctorate
program is not a day program like the Foreign
Service School. You can take classes at night
and in the afternoon.’’ So I accepted.
I decided to go to work full-time and go to
school full-time. Seven years later, I was the
General Manager at MITRE, and all the senior
managers who initially didn’t like me worked
for me, as they always kept reminding me!
[Laughter]
It was kind of funny. One time I was flying
across the country with a guy who was my dep-
uty, and he asked me if I remembered him inter-
viewing me. I said, ‘‘Well, not really.’’ He said,
‘‘Gee, it sticks in my mind just like it was yester-
day. I remember all the reasons I didn’t want to
hire you! [Laughter] Now I work for you!’’ I said,
‘‘Well, I guess you should be happy I don’t re-
member it!’’
When I became a Department Head, I
headed a Systems Analysis Department that
was dedicated to the Army. Later, when I
headed the new Navy Division, I also formed
a Cost Analysis Center. It was working at MITRE
that resulted in my becoming involved with
MORS.
Bob Sheldon: Let me backtrack. What did
you study at Georgetown?
Ed Brady: A lot of macro and micro eco-
nomic theory. Finance and banking. There was
a lot of econometrics, modeling, and dynamic
and linear programming, parametric analysis.
I did a lot in analysis of uncertainty because I
was interested in developing economies where
data is not as rich as in developed economies.
Also a new area, now mostly called behavioral
economics, and which now has been applied
in many areas.
Bob Sheldon: OR kinds of courses?
Ed Brady: Yes, except we called them eco-
nomic courses since that is where these tech-
niques originated.
Bill Dunn: Do you remember any professors
there at the college?
Ed Brady: Father Poirier was one I had.
He taught dynamic linear programs. The Jesuit
fathers were very good at math.
Bob Sheldon: Did you finish that program?
Ed Brady: I never wrote the dissertation.
Bob Sheldon: So you’re ABD (all but
dissertation)?
Ed Brady: Yes. Because by the time I was
ready to write the dissertation, I was managing
a division at MITRE and had 300 people work-
ing for me, half of whom were overseas, and I
went overseas a week every month.
It was just impossible to take enough time
to write a decent dissertation and work. Twice
MITRE agreed to let me take a leave of ab-
sence, and I started working on my disserta-
tion. Within a week they told me they had a
crisis and they needed me to come back. So
I gave up. And my professors were all saying
they didn’t understand why I wanted to get
a degree since I already had a better job than
they did! [Laughter]
Bob Sheldon: Let’s get to your involvement in
MORS. How did you get started in MORS?
Ed Brady: It turned out that the IR&D project
which was my initial job at MITRE was an anal-
ysis of targeting and the use of intelligence for
targeting. In those days, the intelligence people
and the artillery people were very organiza-
tionally separate functions, and half the intelli-
gence people were in what used to be called
the Army Security Agency out at Vint Hill Farms
in Virginia. Those guys were even more sepa-
rated from targeting than the normal tactical
military intelligence guys. Some in the Army
wanted to put together a system that used what
we now call all-source intelligence to improve
targeting. I led that study.
The Army had set up an office at Army Ma-
teriel Command (AMC) on Eisenhower Avenue
in Alexandria, VA called the Office of Sys-
tems Integration. I think this was General Max
Thurman and somebody else’s idea. The Office
was led by Major General Ira Hunt, and he
reported simultaneously to the heads of AMC
and Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC). Key in his role was to bridge the re-
quirements and systems development communi-
ties, and do architecture and systems analysis. He
had seven hand-picked colonels (one for each
functional area) and four hand-picked Senior
Executive Service (SES) Army civilians, and a
major as an aide– that was his entire staff, plus
contract help.
MITRE and a couple of other companies
like System Development Corporation (SDC),
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and R&D Associates were supporting them. I
had these big ink blotter pads because when
you wrote with ink you could use the paper to
blot it. Using colored pencils, I drew a sketch
on the blotter pad of all the different places that
generated information and the channels by
which it went somewhere. I had all the intelli-
gence sources in one color, and all the tactical
front line unit reports in another color, and all
the Field Artillery Observers reports in another
color. I drew the whole thing, and showed how
crazy it was to organize this way if the goal was
to attack targets. The targeting process was very
inefficient and time-consuming. Intelligence
was bound to be late getting to the guns, etc.,
so we should re-cast it all. I reorganized it into
the way I thought it should be as a system,
and I titled this report ‘‘Intelligence, Surveil-
lance, and Target Acquisition.’’ When they
sent the report to the printers, they shortened
that title to the acronym ISTA, and that’s where
the term came from.
After that, I did another study on reconnais-
sance, and ISTA became RISTA. I remember Lt
Gen Glenn Kent (Air Force) was around in those
days, and we were at this Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA)-hosted Intel conference at MITRE
in Bedford, Massachusetts. People were still
fighting about how to organize and how to send
information. They had a dinner the second
night of the meeting, and in the middle of din-
ner Kent went up to the chair of the meeting
and he said, ‘‘I’d like to speak to the group.’’
The chair said, ‘‘Well, that’s fine, Sir, we’ll add
you to the agenda at the end.’’ Kent said, ‘‘No,
I want to speak to them now before I lose my
train of thought.’’ They were in the middle of
serving the entrees, and General Kent can be
a pretty insistent guy.
So they gave into him. He said, "This won’t
take long, but you know, I’ve been sitting here
for two days and I’ve been trying to under-
stand what ‘‘Intelligence’’ means? What does
‘‘Surveillance’’ mean? And what does ‘‘Recon-
naissance’’ mean? And I think I finally have
it figured out so I want to tell everybody."
[Chuckle]
By then, the room is quiet. He said, ‘‘Recon-
naissance is when you go out, you look around,
you come back. Surveillance is when you go out,
you look around for a long time and you come
back. And Intelligence is when you take all that
information and keep it so goddamn long, no-
body can use it for anything!’’ [Laughter] And
he went and sat down.
All the Intel people got the message, and
that’s when they started working on how do
you break down the green door, and how do
you merge things into all-source intelligence,
and the DIA began setting up a system called
the Department of Defense Intelligence Infor-
mation System (DODIIS) to speed the produc-
tion and tactical use of intelligence.
When we were doing the targeting study,
we wanted to demonstrate in a model how
you could improve the accuracy and rates of fire
and effectiveness of the artillery if you rapidly
disseminate actionable intelligence and made
it targeting data.
Robert Finkelstein was at MITRE then, and
he was pretty good at modeling and knew a lot
about artillery. He and I teamed up and built
this model, and the general liked it a lot and
made a lot of decisions based on it. Finkelstein
came to me one day and said, ‘‘We should go
to MORS and present this.’’ I said, ‘‘I don’t even
know what MORS is—what are you talking
about?’’ He said, there’s a meeting in West Point
four months from now, and it’s a three-day, clas-
sified meeting. We can go there and we can give
a briefing. We can explain how this model
works and how we’re supporting the general’s
decision-making with it. That’s what the audi-
ence there likes to talk about and hear."
I said, ‘‘Well, when is it? I’ll have to check
my school schedule.’’ It turned out I didn’t have
anything critical going on at the time—no exams
or anything—and I said, ‘‘I can go. How do I—
how do we sign up?’’ He said, ‘‘Oh, I already
did all that. I was just trying to talk you into
going!’’
We went to West Point; it was 1979. We pre-
sented our paper, and because the whole flow of
work we did over the next three or four years
was all systems analysis of this type, we gave
a paper at every 6-month meeting (Editors Note:
MORS symposia were semiannual at that time.)
on our status, results to date, and the next part
of the work we were doing.
This work led to another analysis we did for
people who worried about what was called
‘‘The Second Echelon Attack from the Soviet
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Forces,’’ and how could you interrupt these
with long-range artillery, missiles, and aircraft?
The problem became that the Soviets had a lot
of air defense systems, and they were net-
worked. The big analytical question became,
‘‘How do you get rid of, or suppress, the en-
emy networked air defense systems?’’
Bob and I started to expand the model to in-
clude networks and enemy air defense, and we
spent a lot of time finding out about ZSU-23s,
SA-8s, the new SA-10s, and other enemy threat
systems. We spent a lot of time with the techni-
cal intelligence community trying to figure out,
‘‘What does the threat information mean in
terms of system performance because technical
intelligence doesn’t always tell you about per-
formance; how to translate what data they do
have into performance estimates and how to
model it.’’ That study became known as The
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses, which is
where the acronym SEAD came from.
For about six years, we were doing this kind
of cutting-edge analysis work and the Army
was making up mission words out of the titles
of the work we were doing. That got us into
architecting divisions and brigades, and I ended
up doing the architecture for what was called Di-
vision 86 in conjunction with Fort Leavenworth
people. It was all pretty innovative and exciting,
and there was a lot of collaboration between
civilian analysts, and the Army user and de-
velopment communities.
Many in the different communities hated
this Integration Office, because from their per-
spective we were outsiders who were always
getting in their knickers and combining things
in new ways, and recommending re-organizing
things in ways they didn’t like. So they lobbied
Congress to zero out its budget and get rid
of it. The systems analysis part went to Fort
Monmouth and became their Systems Division,
and the rest went to Fort Leavenworth and be-
came what eventually grew into the National
Simulation Center. This meant this type of work
was now institutionalized, which was good, but
in two different communities, which was not.
These also were the early Army efforts to
better understand and organize architecture
and integration. Once these efforts became insti-
tutionalized, there were often good managers
and good people populating the organizations,
but they, once again, were separated organiza-
tionally and that separation became very hard
to bridge. The requirements community got
more separated from the systems design com-
munity, and we were basically back where we
started from. The Army seems to go through
this type of thing cyclically, but it was a good
effort.
Bob Sheldon: What was your impression of
the first MORS symposium you attended?
Ed Brady: Well, I thought it was very inter-
esting because, when I started at MITRE I basi-
cally came directly from the combat side of the
military. I thought a system was something
you went to the supply room and asked for,
and they gave it to you or said they didn’t have
one. Learning about all this infrastructure of the
Defense Department and defense companies
was new to me, and I never knew there was
any intellectual forum like MORS where you
could talk to other people who were doing sim-
ilar work, in an organized format and forum.
Up until then, I’d only been talking to people I
ran into, or found while working on other
studies for the same general. I thought the
Symposium was pretty exciting and interest-
ing, and the idea that there were a lot of other
people who were doing interesting work around
the country at the time was pretty amazing
to me. And it is the only forum that I know
of that has the features of allowing classified
discussions and bringing people from the dif-
ferent services together into a common place.
Over the years, Air Force participation, or
Army participation, or Navy participation
would wax and wane; but they were all there
some of the time, and some of them a lot of
the time.
I became more involved in chairing work-
ing groups, then symposiums, and then on the
Board for a long time. We focused on growing
bonds between people who were doing simi-
lar work or complementary work, or using the
same methods and techniques but with a differ-
ent kind of application. One person might be
doing it for the Air Force for satellites, and
somebody else doing it for the Army for target-
ing, but you had these different common things.
It was a place you could get together and talk
about your work and progress and issues, and
things that were holding you back, and get
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some advice from other people. So it was a re-
ally, really good forum.
Bill Dunn: And you were obviously hooked
because you kept going back to MORS.
Ed Brady: Yes, I was pretty active for about
20 years. I was doing that type work. It was
a good forum. It was one of the few places I
knew of where you could talk about classified
work and in a peer-to-peer kind of discussion,
which is not what you get in a normal briefing
of your work.
Bob Sheldon: How did you get recruited
into a leadership role in the MORS Board of
Directors?
Ed Brady: As I mentioned earlier, over a
number of years I had chaired quite a few work-
ing group sessions, and had several roles in or-
ganizing the Symposiums themselves. I’m not
sure I remember exactly how it happened that
I ran for the Board, except that there were sev-
eral people and myself who had a common
feeling at the time that MORS was not all it
should be. Jim Bexfield was in this group, and
Dick Garvey and me, and a couple of others.
I have forgotten the exact sequence of who
held what Vice Presidentships. We sought to
populate the Finance committee, the Manage-
ment committee, and the Symposium commit-
tee amongst us.
We worked out a scheme between us and
several other people to gain momentum. People
like Lanny Elderkin and several others joined
this effort. We led more and more Board com-
mittees, and we worked out a plan to have stra-
tegic emphasis and continuity.
Initially, I chaired the Symposium commit-
tee, when Garvey was President. Then after
two years, I became the President. You can’t
put something strategic into place in one term.
It took having a small group of people who were
all in basic agreement about the changes we
wanted to make. Then, written down as objec-
tives so everybody could see and comment on
them, get the Board to agree in general to them,
and then populate the positions that imple-
mented them. It really was quite a bit of work
over a sustained period.
You had to have the budget guys lined
up with the management guys, lined up with
the symposium guys. And we deliberately went
about that. I think Jim Bexfield was the President
for two years, and then the general idea was I
would run for President and replace him and
continue this. I ran against Hork Dimon, who
was not really part of this movement, and Hork
won. Of course, we had to apply the famous
Dimon algorithm to the vote count to decide this
and that to me was a little suspicious, you
know? [Laughter]
But there was nothing wrong with it, of
course. It was just funny and ironic that his algo-
rithm for breaking a tie had to be used in the case
of his own election. Hork and I got along well,
so that worked out fine. Skid Masterson came
into the group (and became President after
Hork), and of course on the Sponsor side
I worked most closely with Walt Hollis.
We often had problems with the Navy for
some reason. They were not as staunch a sup-
porter, even though they pioneered many OR
applications in WW II. Secretary Lehman didn’t
believe much in systems analysis, and even
abolished OP 96, their systems analysis office.
All this, of course, impacted MORS.
By accident, I had been at a meeting at the
Hudson Institute and Lehman was the after-
dinner speaker and it was rumored he was
going to be nominated to be the Secretary of
the Navy. He gave this speech on the 600-ship
Navy, and afterward I asked him what analysis
they had done to arrive at 600. He said, ‘‘You
don’t need to do an analysis to arrive at 600.
You know the Navy’s too small and 600 is a good
number, and we can get the money for it, so
what do you want an analysis for?’’ The follow-
ing week when it was announced he was the
Secretary of the Navy, I knew we were in trou-
ble. We weren’t likely to get strong support from
the Navy on things like MORS and analysis
and, sure enough, that’s what happened. It was
caused as much by his personality and attitude
about analysis as anything else.
That’s when we invented workshops. It was
kind of a fill-in for the meetings that weren’t
happening anymore because we went from
semi-annual to annual Symposiums. After about
a year, we figured out that with special focus,
smaller workshops could be a good approach,
and we went to Walt Hollis and asked for his
support. ‘‘What if we just held smaller focus
meetings on some particular topic that was of
concern to the sponsors and we didn’t have
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a big full symposium? It would be cheaper and
more focused, and give a better product back to
the government.’’
He was interested because it would be more
responsive to near term issues, and he got the
Air Force to agree and then the Navy. I think
the Air Force proponent at the time was Rosie
Rosenberg (Major General Robert Rosenberg,
a Naval Academy graduate) who was running
Air Force Studies and Analysis. Navy support
was much less throughout this period, but there
always was some important support from the
Navy.
In those days, we also had a lot of arms con-
trol people active in MORS. The State Depart-
ment Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
had a group of analysts who were very active
using game theoretic analysis–Sydell Gold and
people like that. They added a very interesting
dimension to analysis because they used a lot
of interesting techniques different than the
standard military simulation approach based
in Lanchester equations. It was always interest-
ing hearing what they were doing, and compar-
ing that to what we were doing for the military.
Now, I feel like things have deteriorated in
a way. In the beginning, systems analysis and
ORSA methods were innovative, and were used
to make a lot of fundamental changes in opera-
tions and in systems design and acquisition.
Analysts and their techniques were either relied
on by decision makers in a lot of different ways,
or ignored. Now, most everybody uses them,
but it’s not always an improvement. Our tools
and statistics are easy to manipulate in order
to obtain an answer you want to hear.
So now it’s harder to figure out who is
doing good analysis and who isn’t. Before, you
knew that there was a camp that wouldn’t listen
to the briefing, so you knew they weren’t using
any analysis. Now they all use it even if they’re
using it wrongly to get the outcomes that they
want. That’s a problem in that once methods
and approaches become incorporated and insti-
tutionalized, it’s easy for everyone to use them
even when it’s inappropriate given the problem
or objective. It also becomes harder to innovate
to meet the real dimensions of the problem.
I was also on the Army Science Board. Walt
Hollis had a standing panel in the Science Board
on analysis and test issues, and I chaired that for
a good number of years. He often gave us as-
signments through the Science Board that im-
pacted attitudes and views of MORS. For
example, one time he had us look at how could
the Army improve its use of analysis. Specifi-
cally what he wanted us to do was to talk to
the Air Force and talk to the Navy and see what
differences there were. The Air Force Studies
and Analyses Agency was mainly doing what
we on the Science Board named ‘‘advocacy anal-
ysis.’’
The leadership knew generally which di-
rection they wanted to go in, and they had the
analysis done to support that. I had a lot of prob-
lems with this approach initially, but my co-
chair was a lawyer, Larry Storch. Larry said,
‘‘Gee, Ed, I dont know why you have any prob-
lem with that—that’s the way the whole legal
system works.’’ There are two advocates, one
for the prosecutor and one for the defense. They
both do analysis and they both present their ad-
vocacy and that’s how we make decisions. So
why would you believe that’s not the same as
‘‘independent’’ analysis?
Nonetheless, the Army has never come to
view the Air Force’s analysis approach as ‘‘in-
dependent analysis,’’ the way the Army views
it. There are some very interesting and sharp
differences between the services even today on
analysis and test approaches, methods, and
results.
Another thing that I was very active in
when we started the workshops was (and, this
was partly because of Walt Hollis and his
unique role in the Army) bringing the testing
community much more into MORS and being
involved with the analytical community. In the
test agencies, they dont have ‘‘analysts.’’ They
have ‘‘evaluators.’’ And, therefore, they didn’t
believe they belonged in a professional group
with analysts. Of course, we all know it’s the
same thing. Walt, being from the testing com-
munity originally, felt very strongly about having
closer relationships between the two commu-
nities. I started to push for a number of work-
shops focused on similar test and analytical
issues, and we had four or five of them over a
number of years that deliberately brought the
test agencies in and invited them to give papers.
We got a lot of test people like Marion Williams
and others from Air Force Operational Test and
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Evaluation Center (AFOTEC), and Marion Bryson
from the Army Combat Developments Experi-
mentation Command (CDEC) at Fort Ord, CA
to join with us. As a result, MORS even ended
up doing a number of events jointly with the
International Test and Evaluation Association
(ITEA). These efforts were quite successful.
In order to bring the communities together,
we held joint MORS and ITEA meetings and
got people to cross-fertilize much more in
a common form of professionalism. A lot of
test planning and set-up should be done with
more of a mind towards scenarios, numbers
of runs, and data collection and things like that
should be grounded in the statistical sound-
ness of outcomes. A lot of it isn’t any more. A
lot of events today are demonstrations and ex-
periments properly described. They’re not
analyses. They’re not tests. And they can’t be
replicated.
The same is true, I believe, of human-in-the-
loop (HITL) simulations. They give us great in-
sight into organizational behavior and systems,
great insight into human problem-solving, but
they’re not the same as an analysis that can be
replicated. Therefore it is not unusual for recom-
mendations based on them to be inaccurate.
When you use HITL as part of the test program,
it can get perverted if youre not careful about
how you judge the outcome of the HITL simula-
tion compared to the tests. There is a common
tendency to talk about these different types of
activities today as though they’re equivalent,
and they’re not.
Bob Sheldon: Let’s backtrack to your leader-
ship of MORS. You were elected to the MORS
Board of Directors in 1982 and Vice President
for Symposium Operations in 1986. You left
the Board in 1987 and then you came back on
the Board in 1988 and were elected President
shortly thereafter in 1989. Can you talk about
that?
Ed Brady: This has happened to me in three
or four different societies. I told you awhile ago
that I ran and lost to Hork Dimon. I figured, well
that’s it, I tried and this is the outcome. I’m still
interested in MORS, but I’ll go back and present
papers and chair working groups that I am in-
terested in. I’ve been on the Board long enough.
Then, I forgot exactly what the issue was, but
it may have been over finances and sponsor
support. The Society was having a lot of trouble
with the symposiums and getting all of the ser-
vices to participate enough. Senior members of
the Board came and asked me if I would run
for the Board again and I did. I was elected,
and then the next year they asked me to run
for President even though I was not on the
MORS Executive Council.
I therefore had a pretty clear mandate with
the Board of what we had to go do, and the sup-
port of the Board to do it. We addressed the
whole range of problems. I visited all the spon-
sors, talked to them about their likes and dis-
likes regarding the Society and our meetings,
what things they thought we were doing well,
what things they thought we weren’t getting
right. We put all their issues into an agenda
and put them up in front of the Board, re-
arranged how we did business, and what prod-
ucts we had. The sponsors after a year and a
half said, ‘‘We kind of like this.’’ We got it fixed
and MORS went on.
Bob Sheldon: You were still on the Board as
a Past President. According to my records, you
were the only MORS Past President who was
still a full-serving member of the Board past
your tenure.
Ed Brady: [Laughter.] Yes.
Bob Sheldon: And then, I think you served
another year beyond that.
Ed Brady: Well, I like to serve and I like to
participate with others, and the groups that
I’ve been most active in, such as the American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA),
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(IEEE), and MORS. I’m a Fellow in all of them. I
kind of follow the same pathway in all of them
and I’ve been on the boards of all them. If you
have something to give back and there’s a need,
then that’s the way it works. The same thing
happened in the Association for Unmanned
Vehicle Systems, and I was elected President
there in the same way as I was in MORS. I said
that if you want me to come in and help you
fix these problems, then I’m willing to make
the effort, but I need the unanimous agreement
of the Board ahead of time. Go off and have an
executive session, and tell me what you want.
And in all these societies, I have served in vary-
ing capacities after being the President of the
Board.
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Bob Sheldon: What were the one or two top
issues that you fixed during your year as Presi-
dent of MORS?
Ed Brady: The biggest thing was relation-
ships with the sponsors, and a focus on themes
that the sponsors felt were important. This is
necessary in order to have their support. A Soci-
ety like MORS cannot just focus on what is pro-
fessionally interesting to its members. This is
true in the science and technology aspects of de-
fense as well. It’s how we got Science and Tech-
nology Objectives (STOs) and Army Technology
Objectives (ATOs). They follow themes that the
warfighters believe are important or critical to
them. If the warfighters have a need for some-
thing like persistent surveillance, then the lead-
ership wants to see the various defense groups
focus on that. They want to see the group give
some kind of product back in terms of improved
communications, or descriptions of problems,
or solutions.
The thing that is missing from many of
these efforts, and it hampers them and makes
them more difficult and less productive than
they might be, is lack of funding. You can be
on the JCS or the Headquarters, Department of
Army or Air Force, and you can want more
analysis done in certain areas. MORS can pro-
pose it and emphasize it—but, if nobody’s fund-
ing it, it can’t happen.
So we in MORS can have discussions and
we can have forums and we can increase the
emphasis on things, but unless somebody
starts to fund it, no real work gets done. What
I was always pushing for with the services
is, okay, we will have these forums and we’ll
have these meetings. But once you see some-
thing you like, you’ve got to figure out how
you’re going to fund it because if we don’t cou-
ple this with funding, we don’t fundamentally
change anything. That’s the message that I
kept carrying to people. Unless you can put
money into your analytical organizations and
they can let contracts to industry, then we’re
not going to make progress on this topic other
than a discussion.
Bob Sheldon: My first encounter with you
was in the mid-1990s at some workshops on
Distributed Interactive Simulation (DIS) and
Simulation Validation (SIMVAL).
Ed Brady: Yes, I did a series of those.
Bob Sheldon: Any comments about those
workshops?
Ed Brady: A good number of our recommen-
dations have been implemented. We have not
yet implemented everything we recommended,
and not because it is invalid. I see every day
more examples that we were correct.
In the MORS workshops, for example,
we made a big point in our reports about pre-
processing and post-processing tools among
other things. We still are bedeviled by a lack of
those in all our simulations. You have to have
some way to take all the output and arrange it
and create briefings from it that can graphically
demonstrate to people what the results are. To
do that by hand or with spreadsheets is very
time consuming, and frequently it doesn’t get
done well or done thoroughly because there
isn’t enough funding to cover it. We don’t have
proper automated tools that do this for us and
help us do this rapidly and accurately. Although
there are some interesting commercial graphical
tools that are sometimes well used for that.
The same thing goes for input data. You
need a pre-processor, an automated tool that
helps you arrange the data, check the data,
make sure the data’s got integrity and isn’t
flawed, that you aren’t missing things and all
that kind of stuff because today’s simulations
use a lot of data. And to do this intuitively or
painstakingly by going through spreadsheet
after spreadsheet, the timelines are way too long
to be relevant.
I would say maybe 30% of what we envi-
sioned has been implemented in the 15 years
since. We have a long ways to go yet in those
areas. I think those workshops plowed some
important ground, and parts of them took root
and grew.
I led the effort to take the Simulation Inter-
operability Standards Organization (SISO) DIS
principles and convert them into IEEE’s com-
mercial standards, and was active in that for
10 years or so to get that done. Also, I was
active with DoD in initiating High Level Ar-
chitectures (HLAs) and federated simulation
architectures.
Many different military groups had sim-
ulation issues, as simulation became a way to
improve system design and test, and to substi-
tute for lack of space and money in training.
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People wanted to do geographically distributed
simulations without any mind as to what is the
time lag that you can afford between differ-
ent entities. If you’re going to send interactive
simulation data from one place to another by
satellite, are the lags commensurate with your
objective or does it not make sense?
In the Air Force training system, for exam-
ple, to distribute interaction between a wingman
and another wingman across the country usu-
ally makes no sense. These two entities’ interac-
tions are mostly on very short timelines. But to
distribute the tanker planning and rendezvous
with that of the strike package, we can and do
distribute that. So you want the wingmen in
the same facility together, linked together with
some kind of high-speed local area network.
You can’t be sending that data over long, un-
known linkages with uncertain arrival times.
Because in most of these communication links,
you don’t know what the time lag is and it’s
not assured time unless you have them collo-
cated. Yet I still hear people saying ‘‘Why don’t
we just distribute that wingman training?’’
We went from DIS to HLA and federated
systems, and it works really well in the training
community and rehearsal community. I think
people have figured out mostly where it makes
sense to do it and where it doesn’t.
But I am a little nervous about it in the test
community when you run a HITL distributed
simulation and you have one data point. If
you were to try to replicate that, you either are
going to have different people playing it or
you can have the same people play it, but now
they’re up on the learning curve and you don’t
have the same data point anymore. It’s not like
running a stochastic simulation a couple of thou-
sand times and being sure—confident about the
outcomes statistically.
You’ve got to take that into account when
you ask is this valid or not valid and what
caused the outcome, and a lot of people don’t
do that well. They say, well that was the out-
come so it has to be right. What we have done
in a lot of simulations is to place real soldiers
and real operators and users in them. We think
the results are more valid because they’re more
an emulation of real military activity than they
are a simulation. It is realistic in its way, but
that’s not necessarily statistically true. It could
be if we were willing to invest enough time
and funding into running a valid number of it-
erations, but we have seldom been willing to
do that.
Bob Sheldon: Give us an update. Since the
mid-1990s or so, your professional life has tran-
sitioned. Can you talk about that?
Ed Brady: I left MITRE in 1991. I was the
Group Vice President and General Manager of
the Washington operation. That meant I over-
saw all the Navy work, Army work, Defense In-
formation Systems Agency (DISA) work, and
a number of civilian agencies, such as National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA). I decided I was
going to be an independent consultant.
My wife, Faye, and I got married and incor-
porated all at the same time. Only my wife and I
are in this corporation, and that’s the way I’ve
worked for 20 years now.
When I was at MITRE and I was thinking
about leaving, I interviewed with several big
defense firms and they said to me, ‘‘Well, you
have a great record and it’s very impressive
and everything, but you never did a proposal
so we don’t know if you are competitive
enough.’’ The reason I went to work for Science
Applications International Corporation (SAIC)
in my first consulting job is because SAIC was
reputed to be the most competitive company
on the face of the earth. In fact, it could be
downright cut-throat. I figured if I could do
a couple of proposals with SAIC and succeed,
nobody will ever ask me that question again.
That’s what happened. Bob Beyster, SAIC’s
CEO, offered to pay a hundred percent of my
time the day after I left MITRE, so I had a guar-
anteed cash flow.
After several years with SAIC and a few
other companies, we did about eight years
worth of mergers and acquisitions. We sup-
ported about 16 or 20 such activities for six or
seven different clients, and we brokered several
divestitures and several acquisitions ourselves
as investment brokers. Then the money dried
up in this arena coming into the late 1990s for
smaller acquisitions, and there were only really
big mergers and acquisitions. It’s one thing for
Merrill Lynch to do one. It’s quite impossible
if you’re just a couple of people doing one.
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We did strategic acquisitions or divestitures
of under-a-hundred-million dollar companies.
We made a lot of money, had a lot of fun, and
met a lot of different people. I started talking
to the various senior executives of companies
we worked for as to what were their needs. Al-
most to a person, they said the same thing. It’s
getting to be an increasingly competitive envi-
ronment. All we really have in discretionary
funds is for bids and proposals. If you really
want to help us strategically, help us map out
a strategy of penetrating a new market and help
us with the proposal. So I started consulting
with the same several companies I could not
get a job with ten years earlier! We also spent
a number of years consulting with the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
Information Systems Office.
We also did a lot of consulting with the De-
fense Modeling and Simulation Office (DMSO)
when it was first set up and they worked
for Anita Jones. Anita had been on my board at
MITRE, so she knew a lot about what I did
and asked me to come help with the setting up
of that office and writing the first simulation
master plan for DoD. She had a couple of people
in the office who wrote it, and I reviewed and
edited it.
We did a big study for DARPA, which I
was the executive director of for two years, re-
garding advanced battle space command and
control technology opportunities. That’s basi-
cally all the stuff that’s still being implemented
today into systems in the Services’ Com-
mand, Control, Communications, Computers,
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(C4ISR) areas. It was a key component in the
now-terminated Army Future Combat Systems
(FCS). The core of this work is to enable distrib-
uting information and command and control,
and pushing it down into lower echelons mak-
ing the pointed edge of the spear, as we say,
empowered with the knowledge they need to
carry out their mission. It’s similar in some
ways to commercial efforts that focus on ‘‘com-
puting at the edge.’’
Bill Dunn: You became involved with FCS, I
think right from the outset? Back in 2002 or so,
or maybe even before that.
Ed Brady: Right. I was on my second eight
year stint on the Army Science Board, and we
did a study at General John Abrams’ request.
So I came full circle in a way, incidentally,
because remember at the beginning I got out
of the Army due to General Creighton Abrams’
arrangement. General Creighton Abrams is
General John Abrams’ father. Years later, I’m
working for General John Abrams who was a
lieutenant at the time in Vietnam, and now
he’s a 4-star general.
Frank Kendall (currently the Acting Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technol-
ogy and Logistics) and I led a study that General
John Abrams requested specifically on the sur-
vivability of a 20-ton vehicle. When we went
to visit him at TRADOC in Fort Monroe, Vir-
ginia, he said, ‘‘The reason I want this done is
because I have 16 feet of papers and studies
and things about how maneuverable it would
be. I have 17 feet of how capable it would be.
And I have a quarter inch of how survivable it
would be. I need a survivability study to make
me confident about this.’’
Frank and I led that study, which also
had John Gully from SAIC and senior execu-
tives from United Defense-Limited Partnership
(UDLP) at the time and International Telephone
and Telegraph (ITT). We all went to dinner one
night, and had this discussion of whether we
thought this would ever come to fruition as a
system. We thought it should and we agreed
that night at dinner that if it did, we would
form the nucleus of a team and we would com-
pete for it.
Two years later, John called me up and said,
‘‘You know they’re going to do this? Come up
and talk to me.’’ We met and formed the SAIC
team to compete for FCS against Boeing, Gen-
eral Dynamics, and Lockheed Martin as a DARPA
program. SAIC was one of three teams selected.
You may remember what happened was that
the Army decided under General Shinseki to
truncate DARPA’s Phase 1 effort, and go di-
rectly into the System Development and Dem-
onstration (SDD) phase. The teams rearranged
themselves at that point, and SAIC and Boeing
teamed together.
Then in the competition, I led the technical
volume of the proposal for Boeing. I had al-
ready been separately a consultant for Boeing
as well as SAIC for years, so this was an easy
merger for me. We won that competition, and
MORS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT . . . MR. EDWARD C. BRADY, FS
Page 76 Military Operations Research, V17 N3 2012
I was made the Chief Architect and Chief for
Technology. Because of the turmoil in the pro-
gram and the constant financial adjustments of
the budget by Congress, company leadership
kept having me lead restructurings of the con-
tract. I guess this was because of my old general
manager experience.
For the last four or five years of the pro-
gram, I worked as much with the finance
and contract people as I did with the technical
teams. A couple of years prior to the Prelimi-
nary Design Review (PDR), it was pretty clear
there were difficult network design issues that
weren’t laid flat. Boeing and SAIC put to-
gether a special tiger team of about a hundred
people with 13 subteams in it to address dif-
ferent aspects of the network. Brad Cohen
from Boeing and I led that, and got all those
done for the PDR. Then the Army restruc-
tured the program and canceled several sys-
tems. And now the whole program has been
terminated.
The Army got a new competition under-
way for an Infantry Fighting Vehicle known as
the Ground Combat Vehicle. SAIC is leading
a multinational team bidding for this, and I
am the technical lead for the proposal which
has been underway for almost two years al-
ready. We’ll see what happens. I’ll probably con-
tinue to work on the program for a few years
if they win it. I’m only 70. But I wouldn’t mind
retiring.
Because of the pace and intensity of that
whole last nine years, I really haven’t been
able to participate in any professional forums.
Even vacations, I’d book them and then cancel
them, and I’d book them next time and cancel
them. I gave up trying to go on vacation. I gave
up scheduling weekends with my wife be-
cause for the entire eight years, I’ve traveled
90 percent of the time. I’ve been with every
technical work force around the country that’s
involved. Faye is very understanding, and if I
cannot get home for a while she comes and
visits me.
Bill Dunn: Well, it seems that during your
whole career, you don’t know how to take a
vacation.
Ed Brady: No, nor do I know what field of
work I’m in. [Laughter.] I mean, I lead design
teams, I lead financial teams, I lead resolution
of management issues. I work on restructuring
the budgets and that all comes naturally to
me. It’s part of a strategic understanding and
a system’s way of looking at things, as well as
a good grasp of the details. I’ve just been fortu-
nate to be able to merge the strategic and tacti-
cal perspectives together and understand what
the linkages are, how you go from strategy to
tactics, and how to develop strategies in the
first place. I’ve always been shaped, I think,
by education at the Naval Academy and sys-
tems theory, and systems ways of looking at
things.
Going from systems analysis to systems
engineering to design seemed, to me, pretty
natural. And on the dozens of proposals that
I have worked on, I almost always led the
technical sections of the proposal team and
worked with a lot of very fine young people.
Companies I have worked with were always
implementing cutting edge technologies. I know
more about today’s technologies than I knew
about technology 20 years ago when I left
MITRE.
Bob Sheldon: Do you have any parting shots
to your colleagues in the MORS Community?
Ed Brady: I think what we tried to do in my
tenure at MORS is still what people should fo-
cus on. MORS has all the constituent parts of be-
ing able to be a highly professional forum in
a classified setting. In MORS, people can get to-
gether from different agencies and services and
talk about their work and techniques and how
to improve analysis, as well as how to improve
their communication with decision makers.
There is an art to using analysis and using it cor-
rectly, as well as a science of conducting the
analysis. If we focus on that and focus on doing
that well with relevant topics, other things will
take care of themselves.
Bill Dunn: You were honored by MORS and
elected as a Fellow. You are also a winner of the
Wanner Award. Can you tell us about how you
felt about those?
Ed Brady: Fellows were kind of new when
I got elected Fellow. That’s part of being old–
everything that happens is the first or second
time it ever happened. It’s funny because all
my life I considered myself as a very young
person working with much older people. One
time I was walking into a meeting in Aberdeen
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Proving Ground and I don’t remember whether
it was E.B. Vandiver or somebody like that
turned to me and said, ‘‘Hey Ed, how you do-
ing? You feel like you’re getting old?’’ I said,
‘‘No, I hadn’t even thought about it. I am still
working with all you old guys.’’ And referring
to the building or auditorium we were walking
into he said, ‘‘This is a memorial to guys you
and I used to work with.’’ And I thought,
‘‘I’ve got to think about this. Maybe I’m not
as young as I think.’’
When I became a Fellow, I thought creating
the Fellows was a good step for MORS and its
professional growth in maturing as an institu-
tion. And I think the Fellows are a very useful
adjunct for the Board and the Society. I know
many of us get involved in other things and
we don’t necessarily have the time, but there
are always some of the Fellows who do have
the time. If the Board has issues or concerns
they’d like to talk about, or need a sounding
board of somebody who’s maybe dealt with
similar problems before, then they have the Fel-
lows to go talk to. And it is an honor to be recog-
nized in your community.
Other than the one semester of OR I took at
the Naval Academy, I never had an OR course.
It’s just practical application of economic
methods, and other forms of analysis and sys-
tems thinking. To me, most of what we do in
military OR is use techniques that came out
of the economics community. Much of OR also
is best done in multidiscipline teams. My edu-
cation by accident turned out to be multi-
discipline, and fit well with modeling and
simulation. Also, that’s a key part of proposals
and engineering today as simulation becomes
integrated into basic engineering as a method
and a technique. It’s just been a natural evolu-
tion, and I’ve been fortunate to have worked
at many different aspects of this. From a MORS
perspective of analysis, I always felt like I acci-
dentally became an analyst and accidentally
came on the Board. So for people after a lot of
years to say, we’re going to make you Fellow
and later also give me the Wanner Award and
recognize all the work you did, it’s pretty over-
whelming.
Bill Dunn: In the past Gulf War and also in
the current Iraq and Afghan Wars, the military
has been using more and more of embedded
combat analysts. You weren’t a combat analyst,
per se, but you were involved in combat.
Ed Brady: I think that’s an excellent thing.
Military OR is rooted in the analysis of op-
erations. The UK was very operationally ori-
ented in analyzing the air war over England,
and the US Navy was equally operationally
oriented in analyzing the sea war in WW II.
They developed ASW search theory and con-
voy theory and they were using real opera-
tional statistics. All this is reflected in early
OR textbooks like Morse and Kimball. In addi-
tion, actually being in a combat theater and
talking with people in combat provides ana-
lysts a much richer understanding of what
they are analyzing.
There’s two aspects to military OR that I
think are crucial. One is multidiscipline and
the other is real operational statistics and data
to work from. That’s always been the nub of it.
In times of war, I think we always go back to
it, and it’s good for the profession that that hap-
pens, as well as useful to the outcome of the war.
In my view, it brings the profession back to its
roots periodically and refreshes the basics. If
you don’t have that, there’s a tendency for some
people to get more and more esoteric about the
tools they’re using. Many end up caring more
about the development of the tools, than they
do the proper practice of the art.
Using combat analysts and things like that
gets us back to the reality of what we’re really
here to do, who we’re serving, and the purpose
of what it’s about.
It’s interesting you bring that up because
I was at dinner recently with a group of peo-
ple, two of whom are eagerly seeking to go to
Kandahar as part of the contingent of ORSAs
that are deploying to Afghanistan.
Bob Sheldon: Hork Dimon, in his oral history
interview, had some glowing praises for you.
He said that when he got elected as MORS Pres-
ident, he was kind of surprised that he was elec-
ted and had defeated you, and then he realized
he needed a lot of help running the symposium
coming up. He turned to you for help. He said
you did an excellent job. Any comments about
that?
Ed Brady: Hork and I worked well together
as I mentioned earlier. Symposiums were always
my first love in MORS anyway. I understand
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about management, I understand about finance,
that’s what I have to do for a profession too. But,
symposiums to me and later the workshops
are the heart and soul of the forum of the ex-
change of peer views. I was very happy to go
back and chair a symposium. Because I’ve al-
ways held that belief, I’ve probably chaired
40 or 50 national level conferences for different
organizations. Being on a Board is interesting
and helpful in the sense that you get to make
contributions to the direction of the organiza-
tion. But, organizing and participating in meet-
ings is the soul of the Society.
Hork may have seen it as helping him out.
But for me, that’s what I love to do. Fortunately,
I do it well also.
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